

PUTTING EXPERIENCE FIRST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF THE
ARMY JUNIOR OFFICER DEVELOPMENT MODEL
ON COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

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ADAM N. WOJACK, Major, U.S. Army
B.A., Baruch College, New York, New York, 1994

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Name of Candidate: Major Adam N. Wojack

Thesis Title: Putting Experience First: An Analysis of the Impacts of the Army Junior Officer Development Model on Combat Effectiveness

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Eugene A. Klann, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Kurt P. Vandersteen, M.M.A.S.

_____, Member
Douglas E. Stephensen, M.P.A.

_____, Member
Kevin E. Brown, M.S.

Accepted this 11th day of June 2010 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

PUTTING EXPERIENCE FIRST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF THE ARMY JUNIOR OFFICER DEVELOPMENT MODEL ON COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, by Major Adam N. Wojack, 113 pages.

This thesis explored the impact of the Army junior officer development model upon combat effectiveness. The research hypothesis was junior officers do not receive sufficient experiential development prior to implementation as direct leaders, which may have a negative impact upon the combat effectiveness of the units they lead. This thesis defined the current Army junior officer development model, surveyed the evolution of officer development, and explored alternative models used by selected international armies. Research used qualitative analysis to evaluate impacts to combat effectiveness of direct units led by junior officers, using four criteria: the occupational screening process of military personnel; technical competence and organizational stress; confidence, judgment, and the ability to lead by example; and empathy for and understanding of subordinates. Analysis of these criteria across multiple disciplinary sources revealed a bias toward degraded combat effectiveness of units led by junior officers without prior military experience. Analysis also revealed a common period of on the job learning used by many armies throughout history to immerse future leaders in military culture and operations. The thesis recommended the Army begin requiring two years of enlisted service as a pre-requisite of commissioning in order to provide more well-rounded, capable direct leaders.

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ACRONYMS

ALDS	Army Leader Development Strategy
ATLDP	<i>Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report to the U.S. Army</i>
AR	Army Regulation
BOLC	Basic Officer Leadership Course
CE	Common Era
FM	Field Manual
GAO	U.S. Government Accountability Office
HQ DA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NCOCC	Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course
OCS	Officer Candidate School
RMAS	Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
UK	United Kingdom
USACC	U.S. Army Cadet Command
USC	United States Code
USMA	United States Military Academy (West Point)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the impact of the Army's junior officer development model on combat effectiveness. It first attempts to define the model using current regulatory guidance and institutional practices and doctrine, then explores the historical evolution of how junior military officers have been created, and how this has impacted the U.S. Army's present model. Centrally, this thesis analyzes historic, cultural and institutional causes and effects of various junior officer development models upon combat effectiveness.

The inspiration for this study is the researcher's own background. As a prior enlisted Officer Candidate School graduate who began his implementation as a junior officer at the age of 31, the researcher wondered if the Army's model of creating junior officers from recent college graduates averaging 22 years of age was necessarily in the best interests of the institution of the Army, organizational units, the mission, or the officer. The author hypothesized that to place an educated and trained, but inexperienced individual in charge of a group of trained, perhaps not similarly educated, but much more experienced soldiers was a counterintuitive method of organizing a combat unit for success. The author believed this practice was in need of examination.

Recent trends within the culture of the Army combined with a review of historical trends give this topic both timeliness, need, and general interest. Indicators of need are issues within the U.S. Army concerning junior officer satisfaction and retention; the emergence of a professional noncommissioned officer corps that may be assuming duties that have traditionally been the purview of junior officers; the existence of significantly

different junior officer development models in nations with similar military cultures, such as Great Britain, Germany and Israel; and to challenge long-held assumptions about how to “grow” junior officers, possibly resolving some points of controversy about this topic.

Historical Context

First, one point of controversy concerns junior officer dissatisfaction and the future of the officer corps. The body of literature on this topic continues to grow, suggesting the Army is still searching for its optimal leader development model. Beginning in 2009, the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania began hosting a series of virtual conferences on a strategic vision for the Army officer corps, using retention problems with graduates of the United States Military Academy and graduates of scholarship-based Reserve Officer’s Training Corps programs as a starting point for the discussion (Wardynski, Colarusso and Lyle 2009a).

According to these studies, from the mid-1990s and into the early 21st century the Army experienced retention shortfalls in its cohort of junior officers. In response, the Army and other agencies sought to determine the root causes. The Army’s central study of this problem, the 2001 *Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP)*, gave company grade officers the opportunity to articulate their satisfactions and dissatisfaction within the Army’s culture and operating environment. Their responses suggested issues with the Army leader development model, to include:

Junior officers are not receiving adequate leader development experiences. There is diminishing, direct contact between seniors and subordinates. This is evidenced by unit leaders who are often not the primary trainers, leaders who are often not present during training, leaders who are focused up rather than down, and leaders who are unwilling to turn down excessive and late taskings. This diminishing contact does not promote cohesion and inhibits trust. Personnel management requirements drive operational assignments at the expense of quality

developmental experiences. Officers are concerned that the officer education system does not provide them the skills for success in full spectrum operations. (HQ DA 2001a, 1-2)

The above cited responses invite inquiry to determine if institutionally implemented solutions have solved these problems, or if these problems are inherent to the current junior officer development model.

Second, this study provides an opportunity to examine the current “balance” of the junior officer development model across the three pillars of leader development-- education, training, and experience--and examine what impacts this model might have on combat effectiveness. This is compelling because of the publication of the Army Leader Development Strategy in late 2009, which stated that the Army is currently “out of balance in developing our leaders,” and must “restore balance and prepare for a future of full spectrum operations” (HQ DA 2009c, 2).

Third, the emergence of a professional noncommissioned officer corps has created redundancies of capable leadership in direct units, possibly reducing the leader development opportunities of junior officers. Since the evolution of the Army from a post-Civil War constabulary force into a modern professional Army, due in large part to the reforms of War Secretary Elihu Root at the beginning of the 20th century, the Army noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps has grown in additional ranks, pay and prestige, and in professionalism. Proof is in the structured NCO education system, senior NCO participation in institutional policymaking, and the blurring of duties and responsibilities, as well as capabilities, of mid- and senior-grade NCOs with their company and field grade officer counterparts. Perhaps in no other Army in the world today are NCOs as accomplished and prominent as they are in the US military (Fisher 2001).

This study will explore perceived or actual overlap between the duties of NCOs and junior officers in direct units. It will examine if possible redundancies of leadership promote greater efficiency or the opposite: a competition between NCOs and junior officers to “own” certain unit-specific work tasks. In any case, it may provide clues as to why junior officers, per the *ATLDP*, have expressed dissatisfaction for “insufficient leader development experiences” (HQ DA 2001a, 2). Are NCOs currently executing a greater portion of the leader-specific tasks that junior officers expected to do following commissioning? And, are those same officers being hastily promoted and shuttled to the “next job” in order to satisfy the personnel needs and shortages of the Army? The environment for exploration of this portion of the problem is rich, and could point to possible answers about the Army’s rank structure as well as the fair career expectations of future Army officers.

Fourth, other effective armies develop junior officers differently than the U.S., providing an opportunity for comparison with alternative methods. Four prominent western nations with strong military traditions, Great Britain, Germany, Norway, and Israel, all possess armies with cohorts of enlisted soldiers as well as cohorts of officers, just as in the U.S., and achieve results with respect to personnel and leader development on a par with that expected by the American military. Similarities begin to diverge at junior officer development.

The Israeli military relies upon compulsory service from nearly every male and many females in its native population, and selects its officers from among the ranks of enlisted draftees who have already served roughly two years before attending a commissioning school. The Israeli system is worthwhile of exploration and comparison

with the U.S. Army's junior officer development model, since it has placed the experience pillar in the position of prominence, followed by training, with completion of high school the only pre-implementation educational requirement (Van Creveld 1998).

The British military, while similar to its American counterpart in many ways with respect to organization and operations, also creates its junior officers differently. Most applicants for commissions are men and women younger than 30 years old who are vetted through an extensive, multiple-day screening examination and, if selected, sent to the sole commissioning program, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst for a 48-week leadership course. Once complete, graduates are commissioned as junior officers in the British army. No baccalaureate degree is required, though roughly 80 percent of entering Sandhurst cadets already possess a college or university degree (RMAS 2010). In addition, no prior military experience is required, though like the U.S., the British army does have a provision for enlisted soldiers who meet necessary criteria to compete for commissioning.

The German army adds another compelling difference. While its commissioning requirements are centered around academic ability and achievement, future German army officers spend a three-year apprenticeship as enlisted "officer cadets," doing the jobs of soldiers and squad-level leaders before attending university for three years to obtain a baccalaureate degree. Following graduation and commissioning, German junior officers serve as platoon leaders and follow the same career progression as officers in the U.S. Army (von Plueskow 2009).

Research Questions

The objective of this study is to examine the primary research question: What is the impact of the Army's junior officer development model on combat effectiveness? To answer the primary research question, this thesis examines three secondary research questions:

- (1) How does the Army currently prepare junior officers from accession to initial leadership implementation?
- (2) How did the Army's current junior officer development model evolve? and
- (3) What are the alternatives to the Army's junior officer development model?

Assumptions

The chief assumption of this study is that junior officer leadership is a critical aspect of the combat effectiveness of direct-level units, and that improved or degraded leadership based on the education, training, or experience of the leader can impact the combat effectiveness of a unit. In addition, that historical data pertaining to leader development models of the past and from cultures outside of the United States are pertinent for examination and comparison with the contemporary U.S. Army and its current junior officer leader development model.

Certain relevant strategies, laws, and doctrine will remain constant, such as the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS), applicable federal law, and service regulations that govern commissioning and pre-implementation training for junior officers.

Additionally, that the contemporary operating environment remains constant, as defined in the ALDS as "an era of persistent conflict" and a "competitive learning

environment” in which “patient and adaptive enemies” will challenge our forces with “complexity” and “extended time” rather than “mass” and “compressed time,” requiring leaders who are “confident, versatile, adaptive, and innovative” (HQ DA 2009c, 1-3).

Finally, it is assumed that all data in this thesis pertains to both male and female junior officers. Use of the masculine pronouns “he,” “him,” and “his” are for purposes of simplicity.

Definition of Terms

Combat effectiveness: Strictly defined per doctrine: “The ability of a unit to perform its mission. Factors such as ammunition, personnel, status of fuel, and weapon systems are assessed and rated” (HQ DA 2004, 1-35). Related to combat effectiveness, and less generally defined is combat power, which is “the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit/formation can apply at a given time” (HQ DA 2008a, 4-1). Combat power has eight elements, the central one being leadership. According to FM 3-0, “Leadership in today’s operational environment is often the difference between success and failure” (HQ DA 2008a, 4-8). In addition:

Leadership is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. . . . Good leaders are the catalyst for success. Effective leadership can compensate for deficiencies in all the warfighting functions because it is the most dynamic element of combat power. The opposite is also true; poor leadership can negate advantages in warfighting capabilities. (HQ DA 2008a, 4-6)

Direct leadership. Pertains to company-level units, mainly companies, platoons, and squads, in which the link between leader and led is usually face to face (HQ DA 2006, 3-35).

Education. “Instruction with increased knowledge, skill, and/or experience as the desired outcome for the student. This is in contrast to training, where a task or

performance basis is used and specific conditions and standards are used to assess individual and unit proficiency” (HQ DA 2009e, 200).

Experience. Learning and competencies gained through operational assignments. According to doctrine, “through experience gained during operational assignments, leaders acquire the confidence, leadership, and the competence needed for more complex and higher level assignments” (HQ DA 2009e, 1-18).

Implementation. For the purpose of this thesis, implementation is the period of operational experience following professional training for a specific rank group. For example, junior officers begin the implementation portion of their leader development periods following completion of the Basic Officer Leadership Course and any assignment-specific training, such as Airborne, Ranger, or Language School training. Pre-implementation refers to this period of training. Post-implementation refers to the same period specified in the term implementation.

Junior officer. For this research, a junior officer refers to a commissioned officer in the rank of Second Lieutenant or First Lieutenant.

Leader development model. The combination of institutional strategy, regulatory guidance, doctrine, and practice that is applied in the education, training, and on the job experiences of a leader of a certain rank group, such as lieutenants or captains. For example, the combination of source documents and procedures which govern pre- and post-commissioning education and training along with initial job experiences constitute the junior officer development model. The three pillars of the Army leader development model are education, training, and experience (HQ DA 2009c, 1).

Leader development. “The deliberate, continuous, sequential and progressive process, grounded in Army values, which grows Soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. Leader development is achieved through the life-long synthesis of the knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through the developmental domains of institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development” (HQ DA 2009e, 202).

Organizational leadership. Pertains to brigade-level to corps or theater level commanders and staffs, in which the link between leader and led is usually through policies, procedures, and communications (HQ DA 2006, 3-38).

Strategic leadership. Pertains to Army-level commanders and staffs, in which the link between leader and led is usually through resources, regulations, and doctrine (HQ DA 2006, 3-42). Author’s note: for this thesis, this term is interchangeable with “institutional leadership.”

Training. “An organized, structured process based on sound principles of learning designed to increase the capability of individuals or units to perform specified tasks or skills. Training increases the ability to perform in known situations with emphasis on competency, physical and mental skills, knowledge and concepts” (HQ DA 2009e, 205).

Limitations

A notable limitation of this study is the lack of data addressing the combat effectiveness of units during current operations in Iraq or Afghanistan focused on the experience level of junior officers. Because of this, this study relies on social scientific and historical data on items that address portions of the research question.

An additional limitation of this study is the vagueness of data pertaining to combat effectiveness and the measurement of combat effectiveness.

Finally, this study is potentially limited by the researcher's own previous military experience as an enlisted soldier prior to transitioning to commissioned service. Any perceived bias due to this personal experience is unintentional and perhaps unavoidable.

Scope and Delimitations

This study assesses the feasibility and suitability of the current junior officer development model with respect to balance across the three pillars of the Army leader development model. The working hypothesis of this study is that experience is the single pillar of the model most out of balance with the other two. The associated assumption is that this imbalance in leader development may have some type of impact on combat effectiveness. Research is focused on examining the direct positive or negative impacts of the assumed imbalance, with respect to experience, of the junior officer development model on combat effectiveness.

This study does not discuss implications of talent or personal attributes in junior officers, but approaches the cohort of junior officers as a body of personnel who, on the average, are in need of the same professional development in order to function in an institution with no competition--or prior experience opportunities outside of the institution--within contemporary American society.

Significance

Junior officer development is a topic of much controversy, in which most with a stake in the process maintain strong opinions on how the Army should grow its junior

officers. This study enters that arena by attempting to shed light on historical aspects of the evolution of the model, and by introducing recent or little used data into the discussion in order to bring clarity to certain aspects of the controversy, including junior officer education, training, and experience, and their impacts upon combat effectiveness.

The results from this study could be used to develop an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the model the Army currently employs to create junior officers with the goal of improved combat effectiveness. It could also be used to discover if opportunities exist to modify this process in order to enhance the performance of junior officers upon implementation and, by extension, the combat effectiveness of Army units in the field.

This research may also be useful in providing a framework for further discussion concerning the requirement for a baccalaureate degree prior to commissioning for most Army junior officers. In addition, it can generate discussion on the need for more experience-based development for junior officers prior to implementation.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature Review Strategy

The literature in this review is organized into four sections. The first three sections seek to answer the secondary research questions, and the last section presents additional literature to be used in answering the primary research question. The review begins with a detailed examination of the doctrine and structure that frame the Army's current junior officer development model. Next, a survey of the model's evolution over time is presented which examines historical trends of military culture that have shaped our current model. The third section reviews the junior officer development model of four international armies, focused on the three pillars of leader development in comparison with the U.S. model. Finally, this chapter presents the research literature used in answering the primary research question. It is worth noting that literature and answers to the three secondary research questions provide the framework for additional comparison and analysis in examining the primary research question.

This thesis used various types of publications to answer research questions, including military publications such as regulatory guidance, doctrine, and occasional papers and publications. Additionally, this thesis used historical texts, journal articles, and other academic and scholarly publications to provide a context for multi-disciplinary research of the primary and secondary research questions. Finally, this research utilized international military experts in order to fully explain current models of junior officer development in selected nations.

The Junior Officer Development Model

This section seeks to answer the secondary research question: How does the Army currently prepare junior officers from accession to initial leadership implementation? To begin with, federal law, service regulations, and doctrine together provide the requirements, parameters, and guidelines that govern who is selected and how junior officers are developed and prepared for implementation as direct leaders. These include pertinent sections of Title 10, United States Code; Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*; Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*; and Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident and Agile*.

Together, these documents define and describe Army leadership, leader characteristics, traits, and competencies and provide an end-goal for conditions any conclusion in this study must meet. In late November, 2009, the Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey, published the Army's leader development strategy, or ALDS, titled "A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army," which must be considered a key directive for the future of Army leader training and will be used as a primary source for this research, the same as the above regulatory documents.

According to the service guideline concerning officer development and training, Army Regulation 350-1 (AR 350-1), *Army Training and Leader Development*, pre-implementation junior officer development is called the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) and is divided into three phases, each with a distinct education or training course leading to an implementation-ready junior officer. Since December, 2009, the second phase has been discontinued, and only the first and third phases remain. The current

version of AR 350-1, also published in December, 2009, does not reflect this recent change and describes BOLC in its previous three phases. This section will describe all three phases of BOLC per AR 350-1 while acknowledging only two are currently operating as junior officer developmental courses.

The first phase, BOLC I, is pre-commissioning training. It covers the recruiting, application or selection process in order to gain entry into a pre-commissioning program; includes civilian baccalaureate education; and military pre-commissioning education and training. It is complete once the junior officer is commissioned as a Second Lieutenant. The second phase, BOLC II, now discontinued, was experiential leadership development training, and consisted of a four-week individual, leader, and small unit tactics course for all newly commissioned junior officers regardless of branch. The final phase, BOLC III, is branch-specific technical training at the junior officer's branch school, usually several months long, and is followed by additional technical training, such as Airborne, Ranger or Language School training. The final phase of pre-implementation junior officer development is complete once the officer has departed the final technical training school and is en route to his initial assignment as a direct leader of troops.

At this point, the officer begins the implementation phase of his career and begins on-the-job training as a platoon (or equivalent) leader. The junior officer's initial institutional leader development, focused primarily on two of the three pillars of leader development, education and training, is complete. The junior officer then begins development focused on the third pillar, experience, through his initial operational assignment as a direct leader along with concurrent training opportunities.

In a more detailed look, the first phase, BOLC I, is characterized by the preparation and screening of future junior officers, highlighted by application and selection; civilian education; and basic military training. Currently, all applicants are civilian, or prior enlisted or warrant officer, volunteers who request admission based on differing screening criteria into one of three pre-commissioning courses: the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, which is the federal service academy for the U.S. Army; Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs at various 2- or 4-year colleges and universities across the United States and selected territories; and Officer Candidate School (OCS), an in-service school created to allow qualified enlisted soldiers and warrant officers, as well as qualified college-educated civilians, the opportunity to pursue commissioned service. OCS also provides the nation and the Army a surge capability for mass officer production in the event of a national mobilization (HQ DA 2001b, 1-12).

Each of the three commissioning sources share the same guidelines for basic entry criteria, governed by federal law, but differ on service-based requirements for admission, also in accordance with federal law (10 USC 532), due to different histories, capacities and missions. For example, USMA was created by congress in 1802 at the request of President Thomas Jefferson in part to provide a professionally prepared officer corps for the defense of the United States, and in part as an attempt to guarantee the political loyalty of future Army leaders to the federal government (Fleming 2002, 18) through the system of political appointment for entry into the pre-commissioning source. USMA currently maintains the political appointment system, wherein applicants seek nominations to attend the Academy through congressmen, because of this legacy. ROTC

was formed in 1916 as a way to mobilize a large body of semi-trained, college-educated officer potential in response to the post-industrialized warfare of World War I (Lyons and Masland 1959, 40) which created mass national armies. The Army developed OCS in 1942 for similar reasons, but with the mandate of using intensive training to create a large body of officers in a very short time in order to lead the largest draftee Army in American history (Keast 1946, 1).

Due to their differing traditions and original mandates, each commissioning source maintains its own regulatory guideline which governs admissions, training, and other administrative matters. In addition, each source produces a differing percentage of the total output of the Army's second lieutenants, based on annual requirements. USMA, whose cadet personnel endstrength is controlled by federal law, has produced between 17 percent and 22 percent of the overall total for the past fifteen years (Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso 2009a, 7). ROTC's output is forecasted two to four years prior to output, based on differing program lengths for scholarship and non-scholarship cadets, and has on the average produced the majority of newly commissioned officers since the 1950s (Coulombe 2010, 4). OCS ordinarily produces the fewest officers in peacetime, but due to its "surge capability," has historically produced the majority during wartime. In 2000, for example, the last full year prior to the beginning of the Global War on Terror, the three sources produced the following percentage of the Army's newest second lieutenants: USMA, 22 percent; ROTC, 64 percent; OCS, 14 percent. In 2008, after nearly five and six years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively, they produced the following: USMA, 18 percent; ROTC, 40 percent; OCS, 42 percent (Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso 2009a, 7).

Due to each source's individual regulatory doctrine based on mission and traditions, entry requirements vary slightly. USMA, for example, requires applicants younger than 23 years old and without dependents, while OCS has a more relaxed constraint on age as well as number of dependents, since it draws from the in-service enlisted and warrant officer populations for its officer candidates. Educational attainment requirements also vary, due to the university-based structure of both USMA and ROTC, and the compressed production time of OCS. For comparison, the consolidated entry requirements of the three sources are shown in table 1:

Regardless of the slight variations in entry requirements among the three sources as evidenced in Table 1, the commissioning end-product of all three programs must meet a common goal. That goal, in accordance with AR 350-1, is "that each graduate possess the character, leadership, integrity, and other attributes essential to a career of exemplary service to the nation" (HQ DA 2009e, 3-29). BOLC I is complete upon graduation from any of the three commissioning sources.

The second phase of pre-implementation junior officer training, BOLC II, called "Experiential Leader Training," was discontinued in December, 2009. Originally, it began less than 90 days after commissioning, and was described as "a rigorous, branch-immaterial course, physically and mentally challenging, with 84 percent of the training conducted via hands-on in a tactical or field environment" (HQ DA 2009e, 3-30). In its original four-week program of instruction, BOLC II trained new junior officers on advanced land navigation; rifle marksmanship and weapons familiarization; practical exercises in leadership; use of night vision equipment; and squad and platoon situational-training exercises, all leading toward the goal of building, among junior officers, "greater

confidence in their abilities to lead small units, an appreciation for the branches of the combined arms team, and a clear understanding of their personal strengths and weaknesses” (HQ DA 2009e, 3-30).

Table 1. Pre-commissioning source entry requirements: A comparison			
<i>Category/Source</i>	<i>USMA</i>	<i>ROTC</i>	<i>OCS</i>
<i>Citizenship</i>	US citizen	US citizen	US citizen
<i>Age limits</i>	17-23 years old	17-30 years old	18-30 years old
<i>Marital/dependent status</i>	Not married, without dependents	Not more than three dependents	Not specified
<i>GT score</i>	Not specified	110	110
<i>SAT/ACT scores</i>	“strong performance”	SAT 850, ACT 17	SAT 850, ACT 19
<i>Education level</i>	HS graduate; “above average academic record”	Enrolled in college; 2.0 GPA from high school	90 semester hours of college
<i>Physical capability</i>	Physically and medically qualified	Physically and medically qualified	Pass APFT, meet height/weight standards; medically qualified
<i>Language skills</i>	Not specified	English speaker	English speaker
<i>Security clearance</i>	Not specified	Not specified	Must obtain Secret
<i>Moral character</i>	Good moral character	Good moral character	Good moral character; no convictions in civil/military courts
<i>Service limits</i>	Not specified	Not specified	No more than 10 years active federal service
<i>Regulatory source</i>	AR 210-26, 9 December 2009	AR 145-1, 22 July 1996	AR 350-51, 11 June 2001

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 210-26, *United States Military Academy* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2009), section 3-5. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 145-1, *Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Program: Organization, Administration, and Training* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001), section 3-4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 350-51, *United States Army Officer Candidate School* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), section 1-5.

A chief benefit of BOLC II was that it provided basic military or infantry-focused advanced individual and small unit skill training and development for junior officers in the more technical branches, such as Logistics, Military Intelligence, or the Signal Corps.

The course, begun in 2006, was meant to prepare those officers for combat leadership roles in the decentralized operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan during the Global War on Terror. General Martin Dempsey, commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, described the value of BOLC II in early 2009 as, “Getting everyone on a level playing field with warrior tasks and battle drills, kind of getting their head into the idea of being an officer who is a soldier first, that’s what BOLC II is designed to do” (Cavallaro 2009a).

The Army chose to discontinue BOLC II in order to deliver trained junior officers four weeks earlier to their initial units, where on-the-job training as direct leaders would begin. According to U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the list of tasks and drills previously trained at BOLC II would be consolidated into BOLC III (Cavallaro 2009b).

The final phase of pre-implementation junior officer development, BOLC III, begins with branch-specific technical training, commonly known as each branch’s “basic course,” and culminates with “additional assignment-oriented training courses, such as Airborne, Ranger, Language School and so forth” (HQ DA 2009e, 3-30). Each branch’s basic course ordinarily lasts from four to five months. In this period, junior officers receive training on skills, doctrine, tactics, and techniques associated with their branch specialties. For example, infantry officers learn small unit tactics, infantry doctrine, and train on infantry-specific weapon systems. Artillery officers focus on artillery-specific doctrine and tactics, such as targeting, fire direction, and howitzer gunnery. Once BOLC III and additional assignment-oriented training concludes, the pre-implementation phase of Army junior officer development is complete.

Evolution of Junior Officer Development in the United States Army

This section seeks to answer the secondary research question: How did the Army's current junior officer development model evolve? This section will use historical literature to describe the lineage of the Army's junior officer development model.

The history of junior officer development is embedded in the history of the officer profession, which began with the appointment of selected individuals into key leadership positions based on attributes or skills required to train and lead soldiers in battle. The officer profession, although considered a profession for perhaps only two hundred years, is likely one of the world's oldest, as armed groups conducting warfare with other armed groups likely had, or came to need, leaders.

In *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington defined a profession as "a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics." The distinguishing characteristics of a profession, he wrote, are "expertise, responsibility and corporateness." Huntington further defined the modern military officer corps as a profession because it possessed those characteristics (Huntington 1952, 1). Military professionals, continued Huntington, are highly skilled in the art and science of war, through a combination of education, training, and experience unavailable to the public at large. In addition, military professionals are expected to be responsible in the application of this expertise, which is manifested in pledged loyalty to a sovereign, a people, a place, or a system of values. Finally, military professionals are a cohesive group that develop, regulate, and promote their own in accordance with internal values, regulations and traditions (Huntington 1952, 11).

The European Tradition

Officer development models have taken many different forms across many different cultures and societies, and have been shaped by conditions as varied as war and peace, population, politics, and wealth. To more completely understand the modern American junior officer development model, it is important to explore the heritage of this model by examining its roots, which are deeply embedded in the European military tradition.

Europe owes much of its military heritage to ancient Greece and Rome. In Greece during its period of dominance in the centuries prior to the Common Era, a system of citizen-soldiery created cohesive units that used spear and shield phalanxes to great advantage. The first *hoplites*, the ancient Greek soldiers, were all amateurs, but were also all citizens. Guarantee of a soldier's loyalty to the cause of the fight and to the leader was in his right of democratic citizenship--an equal voice in the destiny of his community and state (Hanson 1989, 89). As for officers in the Greek phalanx, literature suggests that due to the non-technical nature of this type of warfare, training was kept to a minimum and leaders led by example, since the leader was also a member of the phalanx and fought in the front rows (Hanson 1989, 107). By extension, the prevailing mode of officer development was likely learning through experience, since most leaders were also citizen-soldiers.

Reaching prominence after the Greeks, the Roman army produced its officers, according to literature, in one of two ways: directly from the propertied, or horse-owning, classes of Roman society or through the ranks after long service (Keppie 1984, 179). The office of centurion is commonly equated to that of company commander, as this primary

unit numbered eighty legionnaires, or soldiers, and was the basic maneuver formation of the Roman legion. Based on certain criteria, such as “reasonable literacy and good conduct,” a soldier from within the ranks “could reach the centurionate in 15-20 years. Most centurions were enlisted men promoted after long service . . . a minority were directly commissioned” (Keppie 1984, 179).

Vegetius, the chronicler of the Roman army of the late 4th century of the Common Era, described criteria for Roman officer selection:

The centurion in the infantry is chosen for his size, strength, and dexterity in throwing his missile weapons and for his skill in the use of his sword and shield; in short for his expertness in all the exercises. He is to be vigilant, temperate, active and readier to execute the orders he receives than to talk; strict in exercising and keeping up proper discipline among his soldiers, in obliging them to appear clean and well-dressed and to have their arms constantly rubbed and bright. (Vegetius 384-389; C.E., 110)

It is interesting that all three pillars of the U.S. Army leader development model--education, training and experience--are addressed in what we know of the Roman model, as described above. The potential centurion had “reasonable literacy,” indicating education; well-honed job skills suggesting long service and training; and was screened and selected not only for desirable personal qualities and attributes, but from among the experienced soldiers within the legion.

It is also worth noting from both Greek and Roman examples the different ways of ensuring what Huntington calls responsibility between officer and the state: citizenship in the Greek model, and temperance, long service, or high birth in the Roman model. Both address expertise in much the same manner, as being something acquired through extended service, campaigns, or training. Education, possibly due to the less technical

nature of classical warfare, is given only passing attention, and refers primarily to literacy.

Following the decline of the Roman Empire, European political boundaries began to split and sub-divide, which caused sovereigns or societies with small territories, minimal resources, and few external interests to find it unnecessary to maintain costly standing armies. As a result, from roughly 1300 to the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648, mercenary armies known as "free companies" organized themselves and sold their services to whomever could pay, regardless of regional affiliation. The leaders of these bands of mercenaries were self-appointed military professionals who were known as *condottieri*, which is Italian for "contractor" (Albion 1929, 98).

In these free companies of the middle ages, the loyalty of the leader was tied to the payer of the contract, and the highest bidder gained the contractor's services. Patriotism was not the prevailing motivation, and leaders were known to delay decisive action of a particular armed dispute in the interest of staying employed. Accordingly, the victims of this sort of warfare were not the men doing the fighting, but "the defenseless civilians," who were "subject to theft, plunder and rape by these international armies" (Albion 1929, 100).

Expertise in the art and science of warfare flourished in the free companies, however, as it naturally paid to be efficient at business. This era also experienced a "phenomenon of extraordinary upward mobility" (Fisher 2001, 7) in positions of military leadership, as job skills acquired through training or in battle became the path to higher promotion. "Mercenary companies occasionally provided opportunities for outstanding corporals and sergeants to rise and in so doing to acquire noble titles and lands from their

royal masters” (Fisher 2001, 7). Schiller’s 1799 play *Wallenstein’s Lager*, which deals with experiences of the Thirty Year’s War, sheds light on the merit-based European leader development model seen in this era of free companies. In this scene, a sergeant sings the praises of military opportunity to potential recruits:

Whoever succeeds in making corporal
Stands on the first rung of the ladder to highest position
And that far can he go
If he can only learn to read and write (Fisher 2001, 7).

The end of the Thirty Years’ War also saw the end of free companies, war as business, and merit-based leader development for the next two centuries. Owing to the extensive destruction by mercenary armies of noncombatant life and property during the war, nations which emerged from the war sought greater control and discipline in the application of military force (Albion 1929, 101). Another factor was the lack of control paying sovereigns (“clients”) sometimes had on their hired generals. The independence of thought and action enjoyed by Wallenstein, for example, who led the armies of the Holy Roman Empire, is perhaps unthinkable today. Wallenstein’s terms of agreement to command the forces of the Emperor may shed light on the shift in Europe toward national armies following this war:

The terms were extraordinarily favorable to Wallenstein but humiliating to the Emperor. As best they can be determined from memoranda and indirect evidence, Wallenstein was to have undivided command; the Emperor himself might not issue orders directly to the army or to any officer save through the commander; Wallenstein was to have the right of confiscation, as well as of levying contributions; he was authorized to carry on negotiations for the Emperor with the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, and to suspend where he saw fit the Edict of Restitution. (Carruth 1901, xxi)

Following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which reorganized Europe into nation-states, ending feudalism, and setting the conditions for the emerging industrial

revolution, sovereigns and heads of state found it worthwhile to maintain standing armies “in time of peace instead of having to hire job lots of soldiers when war broke out . . . to secure a degree of discipline, which had been out of the question with free companies” (Albion 1929, 101). In order to unify loyalty of these forces to the state, the officers were drawn from the privileged classes, land owners, and aristocracy. Accordingly, “monarchs and princes sought by this practice to bind their aristocracies and monied classes more closely to their thrones by reserving for them the higher offices in their armies” (Fisher 2001, 6).

This practice was the beginning of class distinction between officer and enlisted in Europe. Prior to this period, upward mobility resulting in a commission and beyond was possible for men of leadership potential from within the ranks. Following this, class status determined an individual’s occupational ceiling in the rank hierarchy, dividing the notion of expertise along class lines (Coates and Pellegrin 1965, 204). Social and political conditions contributed as much to this change as did bitter memories of the Thirty Years’ War: “During the 17th and 18th centuries . . . in order to provide career opportunities for a large proportion of the nobility and to reserve for the military officer the prestige to which members of the nobility felt entitled, attempts were made at systematic exclusion of commoners from the officer ranks” (Coates and Pellegrin 1965, 247).

For the next 150 years, armies continued to nationalize and officers were almost exclusively drawn from nations’ aristocracies. To simplify this, states such as England offered commissions only through “purchase,” guaranteeing shared interest for the crown among its land-owning officers, and for the propertied classes, “a degree of protection from an abuse of authority by the crown” (Fisher 2001, 21). Professionalism gained

through education, training, and battle however took a back seat to this social arrangement. In this era it was not uncommon when “boys of fourteen were sometimes given command of regiments containing gray-haired captains, of the lesser nobility who had lacked ‘pull.’” (Albion 1929, 103)

The European officer development paradigm changed again during and after the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. In this period, French mass conscript armies led by mostly amateur officers from the common classes overwhelmed armies led by their aristocratic occupational peers. In these French revolutionary armies, loyalty to the state was freely given, as in ancient Greece, since every soldier was a citizen and fighting for a common interest. Napoleon shrewdly capitalized on this patriotic fervor by opening up competitive entry to the officer ranks for all Frenchmen regardless of class or background. “Napoleon told his armies that every man of them carried a marshal’s baton in his knapsack. He did not insist on noble ancestry . . . Sons of innkeepers and small lawyers commanded army corps” (Albion 1929, 106).

France’s revolutionary changes would soon influence the rest of Europe. In 1808, after being defeated by Napoleon, the Prussian government assessed blame for this misfortune on military leadership. As a result, Prussia changed its national criteria for officer selection and removed the discriminator that officers descend from the nation’s aristocracy. “The only title to an officer’s commission,” read the directive, “shall be in time of peace, education and professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished valor and perception. . . . All previously existing class preference in the military establishment is abolished” (Huntington 1952, 30).

The Prussian government also mandated that all officer candidates serve six months in the enlisted ranks in order to develop basic technical skills, and to attend nine months of professional schooling prior to commissioning. These reform concepts are now recognized as the beginning of the modern officer profession (Huntington 1952, 42).

The Emergence of an American Tradition

The American officer tradition begins somewhat earlier, in the years leading up to the Revolutionary War in America. In this era, pre-independence America experienced two distinct and often opposed military cultures: the egalitarian citizen-militia of New England, which preferred unconventional tactics learned during wars against Native American tribes; and the professional European model inherited from Great Britain, which used conventional tactics based on discipline and precision drill (Coates and Pellegrin 1965, 208).

George Washington, considered by most the father of the American military tradition, is responsible for nudging the young American nation toward the conventional European model of a standing army with professional officers and regular soldiers over the homegrown ideal of a responsive, well-armed citizenry led by prominent locals. In doing so, many believe he was simply choosing what “all informed observers regarded as the demonstrably superior system” (Shy 1986, 348). Washington also believed in the European system of professional education and training for military officers, and urged Congress to fund the establishment of a national military academy. Washington’s preference for a standing army and military academy met resistance from current U.S. president Thomas Jefferson, who along with many others of his political party considered the centralized power of a standing army a threat to the young, developing republic

(Fleming 2002, 18). Jefferson eventually relented, believing the security of the nation was dependent upon the proficiency of its military leaders, and in 1802, presided over the congressional creation of the United States Military Academy at West Point. Jefferson gave in to Washington's wish largely because he realized the government could control, by political appointment, which young men became officers, thereby reserving to the state in advance the loyalty of future generals (Fleming 2002, 19).

The creation of a professional standing army in America took root a bit later. The majority of American Army forces up to the War of 1812 were volunteer militiamen, raised by the individual states, and with loyalties that did not always extend to the federal government (Fleming 2002, 25). However, after a disastrous early campaign against Great Britain in 1812, national leaders began to see things differently. In the beginning of this war, British regular forces routed the American militiamen who were led by elected or appointed officers. President James Madison, in studying the after action reports of the war, concluded that academy-trained officers had provided "the bright spots in the dismal performance" of the American Army. Because of this, Madison urged congress expand the military academy to ensure the sustained pursuit of "skill in the use of arms and the essential rules of discipline" (Fleming 2002, 25).

Europe, especially France and Prussia, continued to tinker with an officer development model that insisted upon technically proficient officers while meanwhile reverting in part to a form of social prerequisite in the screening and selection of officers-educational attainment. This was due to the increasingly technical nature of industrial era warfare, with its complex mix of combined arms and logistical challenges. The American model slowly followed suit in its own fashion, expanding West Point to create

more educated and trained officers capable of training an expanding enlisted corps (Fisher 2001, 65).

The U.S. Army of the 19th century, when not in wartime expansion such as for the Civil War--which was led largely by appointed or elected officers--was a decentralized frontier constabulary force. Congress maintained a small endstrength and limited opportunities for advancement, a severe constraint not only on officers, but on enlisted men as well. Part of this was due to the small size of the Army, and part due to its “thoroughly professional” nature, since “increasingly, its officer corps was composed of graduates of the military academy.” A drawback of filling the officer corps with academy graduates, complained some ambitious enlistees, was that this “effectively limited movement from the ranks into the commissioned grades. This left even the most able enlisted men with little choice but to remain with the NCO corps if they chose a military career” (Fisher 2001, 65).

The drawback to maintaining a small, professional Army with limited vertical advancement was in the popularity of the Army as a career option for those with talent and ambition, but no appointment to West Point. In the words of an anonymous soldier critic writing in the 1830s, West Point “has rendered the Army very unpopular and odious with the great mass of the people. Young men of character and enterprise rarely enlisted, because they know well, that on a peace establishment, no higher rank than a sergenty can be obtained” (Fisher 2001, 79). Noted observer of American culture, Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville, wrote on the topic of career advancement in a democratic army, “What soldiers want is not to achieve a certain rank but to keep on

being promoted. While their desires are not immense, they are continually renewed” (de Tocqueville 1845, 766).

The American Army of the 19th century had three routes to a commission, one of which was appointment and graduation from West Point, the other two being direct appointment from civil life, and promotion from within the enlisted ranks. During wartime expansion, such as the Civil War and later the Spanish-American War, opportunities for commissions increased because West Point could not surge in its production of college educated officers for emergency needs. In these circumstances, pathways opened for qualified as well as less than qualified officer potential. A snapshot of the U.S. Army in 1902 showed that of 2,900 combat arms officers, 1,818 had been commissioned since the beginning of the Spanish-American War. Of those, about 15 percent were West Point graduates and 57 percent were commissioned from the regular enlisted ranks or veterans of state volunteer forces. The remaining 28 percent were commissioned directly from civilian life, with no previous military training or experience (Coffman 2004, 50). Peacetime contraction, though, was swift. In a 1909 snapshot, the proportion of West Point graduates was even with that of direct civilian commissions, or roughly 43.5 percent each. The remaining 13 percent were appointed from the ranks (Coffman 2004, 151).

The Army of the early 20th century was modernized following Secretary of War Elihu Root’s landmark reforms. This remade the Army from a collection of frontier outpost units into a cohesive force dedicated to preparing for war. Among Root’s many areas of interest was officer development, and he was responsible for instituting two

changes that continue to have great impact to this day: professional education and printed doctrine (Coffman 2004, 191).

Closely following the reforms of Root was the outbreak of World War I in 1914, and the National Defense Act of 1916, which created the Reserve Officer Training Corps. The ROTC was envisioned as a way of creating a mass body of partially trained civilian “officer potential” for the National Guard and reserves in the event of a national mobilization. Prior to entering the war in 1917, the U.S. expanded the Army from a pre-war endstrength of 98,000 to a goal of 4 million, with 200,000 officers by 1918 (Weigley 1983, 348). Soon though, it became clear that the four-year lead time required to create officers through ROTC or West Point was not adequate to provide the numbers of officers needed. One solution was activating reserve or National Guard officers, and another was commissioning able NCOs from within the ranks. But to accelerate production of officers for war, the Army established Officer Training Camps, which were three-month training courses developed on the “Plattsburgh model” (Weigley 1983, 342; Ellis and Garey 1917). When the Army reached its expansion goal, nearly half of all officers were former civilians trained through Officer Training Camps (Coffman 2004, 205).

Following the war, congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 1920 to increase the size of both the Regular Army, now to 280,000, and the National Guard and reserves. The Act also created the Warrant Officer rank to facilitate vertical advancement for qualified NCOs, and expanded the ROTC to meet the increased size of the force (Weigley 1983, 399; Fisher 2001, 204). The commissioning priority of regular officers was also addressed in the 1920 act, as the appointment of officers in the grade of

Second Lieutenant would be made first from all available graduates of West Point, and “second, from warrant officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army between the ages of 21 and 30 years who have had at least two years’ service” (Albion 1929, 399). Gone was the concept of the direct commission from civil life: all officers in the U.S. Army would now be required to have some combination of education, training, or experience prior to commissioning, depending upon the route. For example, a West Point Second Lieutenant was educated and received some training before implementation, but generally had no experience. The enlisted men and warrant officers directly commissioned were trained and experienced, but on the whole had less education than the West Point officers.

The interwar period between 1918 and 1941 saw no significant changes in officer development in the U.S. Army. As the Army stabilized during two decades of peace, entry into the commissioned ranks became more competitive, resulting in most new officers being college graduates (Coumbe 2010, 2). While a college degree was not required to obtain a commission, the relatively small size of the Army and the few number of available commissions per year made possessing one a desirable mark on a candidate’s application (Coumbe 2010, 2). Still, education requirements were vague at best. A 1919 Army publication, *History of the Army Personnel System*, described officer education requirements mandated by the Commissioned Personnel Branch in the fall of 1918: “The least schooling which will fit a man the position. Note:--if schooling is not a decisive qualification, the expression ‘no arbitrary requirements may be used.’” (HQ DA 1919, 228).

As America entered World War II in late 1941, the U.S. Army was faced with the same type of emergency expansion it had faced in the previous World War. Again, neither West Point nor ROTC could surge to produce increased numbers of college educated officers, since both needed four, or at best three, years of lead time. For numbers comparison, the West Point class of 1941 commissioned 424 officers (USMA 2010a) against a strategic goal of nearly 800,000 officers required by 1945 to lead a draftee Army of eight million. ROTC was in a less advantageous position, as Army Ground Forces Command soon determined that the Reserve and National Guard officers created through this program would need an additional train-up before they were ready to lead soldiers (Keast 1946, 1).

To solve this problem, Army Ground Forces Command in 1941 created the Officer Candidate School: initially a 23-week course to create second lieutenants out of qualified enlisted men and civilians, (Keast 1946, 4) eventually the source of nearly three-quarters of the Army's officers during the war (Stouffer 1947a, 232). In selecting its pool of officer candidates to lead soldiers in this war, Army Ground Forces Command envisioned a mix of 25 percent college graduates, 25 percent personnel with two years of college, and 50 percent high school graduates. The Army felt that keeping educational requirements flexible, and entry open to both enlisted personnel and civilians was good for morale in a national wartime Army (Keast 1946, 4). With Officer Candidate School in World War II, the Army used varied requirements for both education and experience in creating its junior officers. The one pillar of the leader development model that remained the same for all officers was training.

Following World War II, the American junior officer development model changed little. ROTC became the largest supplier of officers during peacetime years, and OCS continued to be the expansion producer of officers during wartime, including Korea, Vietnam, and as recently as 2008 during the Global War on Terror (Coumbe, 2010, 4; Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso 2009a, 7). Education requirements remain the same for ROTC and USMA officers, and have shifted from a minimum of 60 college credit hours to the current 90 credit hours for OCS graduates. All junior officers received the same training following commissioning, and experience development still occurs largely during implementation.

Alternative Models of Junior Officer Development

This section seeks to answer the secondary research question, “What are the alternatives to the Army’s junior officer development model?” by reviewing the current standards or practices of a select group of international armies, focused on the experience pillar of the leader development model prior to implementation. For the sake of scope and brevity, this section will explore the commissioning models of only four international armies--Germany, Norway, Israel, and the United Kingdom--all with strong military traditions, habitual associations with the U.S., and recent combat experience in the middle east, Afghanistan, or both. All were chosen because their individual systems of junior officer development vary enough from the U.S. Army model to promote comparative analysis.

While literature on British military systems and culture is readily available, there exists a shortage of current source material in the English language on the contemporary military cultures of the German, Norwegian, and Israeli armies. Therefore, it was

necessary to query international military officers for information on current leader development models and practices used by their armies. Information was obtained from four international military officers, all of field grade rank, at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: one each from the Israeli, British, Norwegian, and German armies. The basic question posed to each was a query of how their nation creates its land force officers from selection to commissioning thru company-level development and training. The information gained was compelling in that it reveals how differently each nation, with roughly comparable modern military cultures, goes about this process of creating its officers.

The purpose of this portion of the research is to examine the fundamental assumptions used by each nation in this process (the search for talent and creation of military leaders) and use this data for comparison with U.S. Army assumptions about junior officer development. Additional literature that will also help answer this research question include, *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* edited by Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (1988), *Portrait of the Israeli Soldier* by Reuven Gal (1986), and “An Evaluation of Alternatives to Existing US Army Commissioning Programs,” by Colonel Joseph C. Sheridan (1992). A description of these individual models follows.

Germany

Germany uses a six-year model for commissioning its officers, in which an aspiring officer must apply for and be accepted into the program prior to his 23rd birthday, mainly to ensure he is less than 30 years old prior to his implementation as a junior officer. Acceptance into the officer development program of the German army does have a certain social pre-requisite, in that all applicants must be graduates of a

gymnasium, which is the highest level of Germany public school education. It is also the only level that prepares students for attendance at a university. Of course, attendance at a *gymnasium* is open to all schoolchildren in Germany on an academically competitive basis (von Plueskow 2009).

In the German model, the first three years of officer development following selection consists of initial entry training and an apprenticeship as both a soldier in the ranks, an NCO and leader of trainees, and as a student in various specialty and leadership schools. The officer cadet is identified as such even while performing as a soldier in the ranks or as an NCO leading other soldiers or trainees. At the end of this three-year period, the officer is commissioned as a second lieutenant, and given an additional three-month apprenticeship as a platoon leader before being sent to a university for three years to obtain the equivalent of a master's degree. Upon graduation, the officer is promoted to First Lieutenant and his implementation period as a platoon leader in a troop unit begins. Ordinarily, the junior officer will function as a platoon leader, company executive officer or battalion staff officer for his first three years, and then receive promotion to Captain--much like in the U.S. Army (von Plueskow 2009).

In the German model, all three pillars of the Army's leader development model receive significant attention. First, after three years of training and leading as a private soldier, NCO and officer cadet, all commissioned officers are considerably experienced with respect to basic military technical, tactical, and cultural matters. Second, a graduate-level education is provided after training and prior to implementation, in part to ensure only those committed or able enough to meet this requirement continue as officers. Dropouts from university education, sometimes as high as 30 percent, serve the

remainder of their commitment to the army as NCOs. The purpose behind the university degree is twofold: it provides educated feedstock for the field grade and senior ranks should the officer choose to continue in service beyond the initial 12-year commitment; and it prepares the individual for a follow-on career should he choose to depart the service (Sheridan 1992, 20). Third, all potential officers receive significant training, in the form of three years of military specialty schooling and on-the-job training prior to functioning as platoon leaders in operational units (von Plueskow 2009).

One uncommon aspect of the German model is that only enough officers needed to serve as company commanders are projected for commissioning. Obviously, the number of required platoon leaders is mathematically higher than the number of required company commanders. To solve this officer numerical shortfall, the Germany army uses experienced NCOs, usually the equivalent of a U.S. Army Sergeant First Class or Master Sergeant, to lead the two of the three platoons in the typical infantry or armor company (von Plueskow 2009). These experienced NCOs ordinarily serve as platoon leaders for 10-12 years while the officer platoon leader serves for one to two years before moving on to other jobs within the company or battalion. Most experts consider these long-term NCO platoon leaders to be superior to their junior officer counterparts due to their experience, maturity, credibility within the unit, and familiarity with common tasks (von Plueskow 2009). In this respect it seems the German army places great emphasis on the experience pillar of leader development, especially at the tactical level traditionally commanded by junior officers.

Norway

Norway creates officers in a manner similar to Germany, with an emphasis upon selection, training, and apprenticeship of officer potential prior to commissioning and leading troops. Commissioning is predicated upon successful completion of a specialty military occupational school and service in that specialty as an NCO for one year prior to attending the Norwegian military academy, a four-year university. Upon graduation, the cadet is commissioned as a Second Lieutenant and is implemented into the operational force (Helleberg 2010).

Since Norway is a conscript force with a minimum one-year commitment for non-career soldiers, those who desire may apply for officer selection either at the beginning or completion of this required one year of service. Applicants must be high school graduates and pass a four-week screening process. The enlisted and NCO experience requirement means that officer cadets begin the academy with roughly two years of service and experience as direct leaders of troops. In addition, officer cadets must be no older than 28 prior to entering the academy. This somewhat relaxed age requirement produces an older cohort of officers. One Norwegian company commander, himself aged 36, recalled the ages of his platoon leaders during a deployment to Afghanistan in 2006-7 as being 32, 33, and 35 (Helleberg 2010).

An uncommon aspect of the Norwegian commissioning model is its insistence upon an enlisted apprenticeship even if an officer cadet is admitted directly into the commissioning academy without prior military experience, which has recently begun on a small scale. In this case, the academy graduate will spend two years as an NCO, serving

an apprenticeship as a junior leader before assuming his commissioned rank and job as platoon leader (Helleberg 2010).

The Norwegian junior officer development model, like the German model, provides apparent balance across the leader development pillars of education, training and experience. Like the German model, subsidized education takes place after an initial two to three year enlistment, which functions as both a training and screening process. During this time, the potential officer learns a military specialty as well as direct leadership lessons as an NCO, and gains organizational and operational experience in a unit.

Israel

Israel shares some common ground with both the German and Norwegian systems in that two to three years of enlisted experience ordinarily precedes commissioned service. Due to several regional wars and continuing regional instability, Israel maintains a system of universal military service for its national defense. The majority of the eligible male population, and a portion of the eligible female population is drafted every year to maintain an armed force that by some accounts is 15 percent of the population of the nation (Shahar 2009). All draftees or volunteers enter as enlisted soldiers with service commitments of three years (two years for females), and are continuously evaluated and screened for leadership potential by their supervisors and commanders (Gal 1986, 68).

An Israeli soldier who shows promise of becoming a capable leader will first be sent to an NCO training course and then function as an NCO in a direct unit. After serving two to three years total, the soldier selected for officer training attends an eight-month commissioning course and is then implemented as a platoon leader in Israel's

operational force. Education beyond high school graduation is not required to become an officer in the IDF, nor has education historically been given much attention in the Israeli junior officer development model (Shahar 2009).

Israel's system of placing emphasis on training and experience and bypassing education during junior officer development creates a relatively younger officer than is common in many other armies. Some tradeoffs exist because of this: one, while young, the officer is trained and experienced at an age when officers in other armies are beginning their implementation periods; two, the lack of a university education becomes problematic for officers when they reach the field grade ranks and the work problems become more complex; and three, the lack of formal education beyond high school makes employability for former officers more difficult after departing the service.

Israel institutionalized educational changes in the late 1990s intended to improve the conditions created by the bypassing of higher education for officers, and have provided college opportunities for captains who choose to remain in the service for an additional number of years (Van Creveld 1998, 316). However, this has no impact on Israel's junior officer development model.

The uncommon aspects about Israel's model is its emphasis on experience and expediency. A mass draft nation with a military culture that is highly respected internationally, Israel currently can afford to allow talent to compete for prestigious officer positions based on the assumption that the best soldiers will invariably make the best combat leaders. Israel's attention to the pillars of the leader development model are clearly weighted toward experience and training, with education considered less

necessary. Unlike Germany or Norway, Israel provides college to officers following implementation rather than beforehand.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom army junior officer development model resembles more closely the U.S. model rather than the German, Norwegian, or Israeli models, with the exception of a few key areas. The similarities are not surprising, since the U.S. inherited much of its military culture from the U.K., and there remains a strong tradition of partnership between the two nations. The differences however, are surprising, since the U.K., which preferred a system of purchase to award commissions as recently as 1871, now has a progressive military culture with respect to commissioning opportunities for enlisted personnel that the U.S. has yet to consider.

U.K. officers are divided into two groups: Direct Entry and Late Entry. Direct Entry officers are either civilians or enlisted soldiers who meet entry criteria, are less than 28 years old, and are accepted into and graduate from the U.K.'s single source of commissioning: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, as second lieutenants. Late Entry officers are enlisted soldiers who have reached the rank of warrant officer (equivalent in scope to First Sergeant or Sergeant Major in the U.S. Army) and apply for commissioning in order to continue their careers to eligible retirement age. Late Entry officers, typically with 16-20 years of active service, are commissioned as captains following completion of the commissioning course at Sandhurst (Norton 2009).

The U.K. has no mandatory education requirement beyond high school graduation for acceptance into Sandhurst for either Direct Entry or Late Entry officers, but in practice the majority of entrants are university graduates (Norton 2009). Sandhurst is also

unique in that it is not a university or a degree-producing institution but a leadership school for the pre-commissioning training of military officers. It has a 48-week curriculum, and upon graduation, officers are sent on to specialized branch training and then implemented as direct leaders of troops in operational units (Norton 2009).

The U.K. is similar to the U.S. in that prior military experience is not required in Direct Entry officers, but allowance is made for qualified enlisted soldiers to compete for admission to Sandhurst and earn commissions. The key difference in U.S. and U.K. junior officer development models is the variety and scope of national commissioning sources. While two of three U.S. sources, USMA and ROTC, award commissions along with the attainment of higher education and the third, OCS, requires three-quarters completion of the same prior to acceptance, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst provides a sustained period of leadership training with no concurrent educational goal or credit.

Applying the pillars of the leader development model, the U.K., with its majority intake of college-educated applicants for commissioning at Sandhurst, places emphasis upon training but does not neglect education completely. Unlike the U.S., which requires all officers to have completed a baccalaureate degree prior to promotion to captain (10 USC 12205), the U.K. allows officers without a university education to continue into the field grade ranks and higher with no requirement beyond scheduled professional schooling, such as field grade level education. The similarity between the U.S. and U.K. model is in the pillar of experience. Both systems “project rather than evaluate” the “expected performance as officers . . . in the context of the military environment” (Sheridan 1992, 12).

Impacts to Combat Effectiveness of Junior Officer Development Model

This section discusses additional literature this thesis will use to answer the primary research question: What is the impact of the Army's junior officer development model on combat effectiveness?

Among the most important sources in examining the impacts of the junior officer leader development model on combat effectiveness was Samuel Stouffer et al's *The American Soldier*, a landmark social psychological survey of World War II Army soldiers focused on a range of experiences, from feelings about combat to attitudes toward officers. Stouffer's work provides direct feedback on the effectiveness of the American Army's junior officer development model during World War II, which was dramatically different than its model during the interwar period and provides clues about possible friction points within the current model.

Another important group of sources are the groundbreaking works of military sociology that began to emerge in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States. Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* is the most prominent, but not to be overlooked are works by Morris Janowitz, Charles Moskos, and the team of Charles Coates and Roland Pellegrin. Janowitz' *The Professional Soldier*, Moskos' *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* and Coates and Pellegrin's *Military Sociology* explore many of the above topics including education and career advancement, social stratification, organizational stress and the military rank dichotomy, all of which can be directly or indirectly linked to the combat effectiveness of small units.

This survey of the junior officer development model is not complete without examining the development of the Army's noncommissioned officer. Ernest F. Fisher's

Guardians of the Republic: A History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps of the U.S. Army is the most comprehensive source. Fisher surveys the history of noncommissioned officers from beginnings in Europe to the professionalism of today and the influences both elements of the military rank dichotomy have had on the other through our nation's military history.

Other works that contribute in part to answering this central question including Martin Van Creveld's *The Training of Officers*; Robert Albion's *Introduction to Military History*; Donald T. Vandergriff's *The Path to Victory*; Victor Davis Hanson's *The Western Way of War*; Christopher Kolenda's *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*; William Keast's *U.S. Army Ground Forces Study No. 6: The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*; and Gene Lyons and John Masland's *Education and Military Leadership*.

To gain insight on the latest trends concerning the current junior officer development model, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a virtual conference on an officer development strategy for the Army in 2009-10. The United States Military Academy Department of Manpower Analysis faculty team of Casey Wardynski, Michael J. Colarusso, and David S. Lyle wrote a series of papers for this virtual conference to examine issues and inspire discussion on this topic. Their monograph series, "Towards a U.S. Army officer corps strategy for success: A proposed human capital model focused upon talent," is useful in comparing current issues and concerns with historical data, such as that provided by Samuel Stouffer et al in *The American Soldier*, and with the sociological work of such writers as the team of Coates and Pellegrin.

Another primary source is the Army's 2001 examination of the job satisfaction of its officers. The study, the *Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army (ATLDP)*, began as the Army's attempt to comprehend and solve retention, morale, and job satisfaction issues among its officer corps by surveying the field and providing feedback. The study found several causes for junior, mid-grade and even senior officer dissatisfaction, and it is the *ATLDP* that informs a portion of this paper's problem statement, since it is a research assumption that the problems identified in the *ATLDP* still exist.

Following the *ATLDP* in addressing problems with Army officer job satisfaction and searching for answers is the US Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 2007 report, "Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges," which surveys the success (in officer retention) of reforms inspired by *ATLDP* survey results. The 2007 GAO report indicates that the *ATLDP* may not have identified the most critical problems concerning officer retention and suggests a fresh look is needed at the current state of the Army officer corps. An associated work is a 2002 IBM corporation study titled, "The Influence of Organizational Commitment on Officer Retention: A 12-Year Study of US Army Officers," by Stephanie C. Payne et al.

Summary

This chapter provided answers to the three secondary research questions of this thesis: the definition of the junior officer development model; the evolution of this model; and alternatives to this model. This chapter also discussed the literature used for the chapter 4 analysis and findings concerning the primary research question. The next chapter will describe the research methodology for this thesis.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study seeks to answer the primary research question, “What is the impact of the Army’s junior officer development model on combat effectiveness?” through qualitative analysis of the literature discussed in chapter 2. Answers to the secondary research questions were presented in the literature review, but are further analyzed in chapter 4. The research hypothesis is that experience is the pillar of the leader development model most out of balance with the others (education and training) in junior officer development. This focuses the research to answer what impacts to combat effectiveness are created by this imbalance of experience in the pre-implementation development of junior officers.

Few comprehensive studies exist that directly address how or why experience is a crucial portion of junior officer development prior to implementation. Some studies indicate that given a well-screened group of talented officer material as a starting point, education and training can produce successful leaders. The importance of experience in the U.S. Army junior officer development model, however, has not been adequately analyzed. This study consists of a qualitative analysis of various data sources--historical, social scientific, and expository--in order to provide comprehensive and specific findings to a question with mostly general and subjective answers. The conclusions drawn from this research will facilitate future study on the subject of leader development or help shape recommendations for the future development of junior officers in the U.S. Army.

This chapter contains three sections: an explanation of the research criteria; a description of the research methodology; and a presentation of the strengths and weaknesses of the research methodology.

Research Criteria

This study consists of a qualitative analysis of the positive and negative impacts of experience in the current U.S. Army junior officer development model on combat effectiveness, using four emergent patterns of importance derived from an initial review of the literature. The research criteria were selected due to their central significance in combat leadership, according to a broad survey of the literature, and due to their recurrence throughout the body of literature. Those items are: (1) the occupational screening of junior officers; (2) technical competence and organizational stress; (3) confidence, judgment, and leadership by example; and (4) empathy for and understanding of subordinates. It is important to note that the research criteria were developed after the study began, in order to reduce broad data and identify the most likely patterns associated with the research question and to continue the analysis.

Research Methodology

This research examines the impact upon combat effectiveness of less or more experience in a junior officer when applied to the four criteria, using a qualitative analysis of the literature presented in chapter 2. Research examined the literature sources for examples of positive and negative impacts to combat effectiveness as they related to different models of leader development, and then compared to the current U.S. Army junior officer development model. Since this study focuses on the leadership aspect of

combat effectiveness, only examples related to leadership were considered in the analysis and findings. Other factors of combat effectiveness, such as maintenance status, ammunition status, and others per the definition in chapter 1, were not considered or analyzed. The results of the analysis of the criteria are presented in chapter 4.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Methodology

The strengths of this methodology are in the development of the criteria, which emerged during initial research as strongly associated with the primary research question, and invited continued analysis. The criteria also require a broad analysis of sources across multiple disciplines--history, social science, current news, doctrine, and description of international models by experts--to adequately present findings.

The weaknesses of this methodology are the ever present hazards of subjectivity when conducting qualitative analysis. The varied source material results in broad, often unscientific answers that may not conclusively determine if positive or negative impacts, while in evidence analytically, are sufficient to inspire a recommendation for change in the model. Quantitative analysis was not feasible for this study due to the human aspect of leadership and since it is unclear if any compelling statistical research exists that links experience in junior officers to effectiveness in combat.

Summary

This study answers the primary research question by conducting a qualitative analysis of the literature presented using selected criteria and the leader development model pillar of experience, compared against the definition or condition of combat effectiveness. These resulting answers are examined as impacts of the U.S. Army's junior

officer development model upon combat effectiveness, and are organized and presented as such in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to present the analysis and findings concerning the primary research question, What is the impact of the Army's junior officer development model on combat effectiveness? using the research methodology presented in chapter 3 and the literature discussed in chapter 2. This chapter also analyzes the findings of the secondary research questions, which were surveyed in chapter 2, in order to provide a framework for answers and analysis of the primary research question.

To review, the secondary research questions are: (1) How does the Army currently prepare junior officers from accession to initial leadership implementation? (2) How did the Army's current junior officer development model evolve? and (3) What are the alternatives to the Army's junior officer development model?

This chapter begins with an analysis of the three secondary research questions, followed by findings and analysis of the primary research question based on the four research criteria presented in chapter 3. The findings associated with the primary research question are provided in four sections, each focused on one research criterion.

Analysis of the Current Army Junior Officer Development Model

It is apparent, based on discussion of this model in chapter 2, that four general characteristics define our junior officer development model: egalitarian social entry, educational attainment prior to entry, training upon entry, and no prior military experience required. This analysis is important in order to ascertain the validity of the research hypothesis, which posited that experience is the single pillar of the leader

development model most out of balance with the other two pillars. A discussion of each characteristic and a summary of analysis follows.

First, egalitarian social entry. Commissioned service remains open to all qualified U.S. citizens regardless of the applicant's or his parents' income, profession, or religion. In addition, women and minorities compete equally for commissions in today's Army. Social group or class identifiers, such as income, gender, or race, are not criteria for entry into the commissioned grades (Sheridan 1992, 10-11).

Second, educational attainment prior to entry. Both USMA and ROTC are baccalaureate-degree producing commissioning sources, and OCS, the other source, requires 90 college credit hours (three years of college) for in-service candidates prior to entry, and a college degree for "college option" enlistees with no prior military experience. In addition, federal law requires all officers to obtain a baccalaureate degree before being promoted to captain (10 USC 12205), which at this writing, occurs 42 months after commissioning. Clearly, obtaining a college degree is integral to the junior officer development process and can be considered, with a few exceptions, a prerequisite of commissioning (Sheridan 1992, 11).

Third, training upon entry. The Army has developed standardized pre-commissioning and post-commissioning training courses for junior officers to prepare them to execute individual and unit combat tasks such as marksmanship, land navigation, first aid, and small unit tactics, as well as branch-specific technical training in preparation for implementation assignments as direct leaders in their unique career fields. The training is regulated and conducted by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,

and ensures all junior officers, regardless of commissioning source, are equally prepared to function as leaders of troop units.

Fourth, no military experience required prior to entry. While OCS traditionally commissions junior officers with some or much enlisted experience, this is based as much on a demand from below as it is on a pull from above. OCS also offers college graduates from civilian life with no previous military experience a path toward an Army commission. USMA offers a certain number of appointments each year to qualified active duty enlisted soldiers who meet age and other requirements, but the majority of cadets enter directly from high school (the USMA demographic profile of the class of 2013 listed 25 combat veterans, or 2 percent, in a freshman class of 1,299 cadets; ordinarily, USMA offers openings to about 200 prior enlisted soldiers annually.) (USMA 2010b) ROTC is similar, in that it is an option or for active duty soldiers to compete for scholarships or for prior-enlisted soldiers attending college full time to pursue commissioned service, but this is also the exception and not the rule (the allocation of direct scholarships to ROTC for active duty enlisted soldiers for school year 2010-11 was 165, out of a program-wide enrollment of about 20,000 ROTC cadets.) (USACC 2010a, 2010b)

The first three characteristics are generally unproblematic when considered as possible impacts to combat effectiveness. The fourth characteristic, the waiver of prior military experience for cadets and some officer candidates, can be seen as a positive in that it opens doors for talented individuals to begin their careers as officers rather than enlisted men, but can also be seen as a negative, since the primary research question analyzes whether a junior officer without experience is as effective as a junior officer

with experience. This final characteristic and its negative connotation is the first instance of agreement with the hypothesis of this research: that experience is the single pillar of the leader development model most out of balance with the other two.

Analysis of the Evolution of Junior Officer Development

Without revisiting the survey of the evolution of officer development presented in chapter 2, a thorough analysis of this topic reveals surprising variety and flexibility, along with recurrence over several centuries, of different ways to create military leaders. Many things remained constant, among which were the pillars of the Army leader development model: education, training, experience. These three leader ideals were present in all historical models of officer development in some form of balance. In addition, a key observation is that factors greater than military culture, such as time and resources available, often dictated which aspects of leader development were most desired, such as training, and which were least important, such as education or experience. The key takeaway from analyzing this secondary research question is that military officers have not always been developed the way they currently are in the United States, nor does one specific leader development “blueprint” exist throughout history that guarantees success at producing combat-effective leaders.

Analysis of Selected International Models

An examination of the junior officer development models of four selected international armies revealed three distinct models. Two models, those of Germany and Norway, were similar in that all future officers conducted an enlisted apprenticeship of sorts prior to officer training, university education, and commissioning. A second model,

that of Israel, also required an enlisted apprenticeship before selection into officer training, but delayed university education until after promotion to captain. The third model, that of the United Kingdom, provided the longest officer training program but did not include an Army-provided university education or enlisted apprenticeship within its model. Rather, the U.K. model overwhelmingly (80 percent) selected university graduates without prior military experience to attend its extensive training program (RMAS 2010).

Three observations can be made about the models in use by these selected nations. First, three of four place experience at the beginning of their junior officer development cycle, regarding basic military experience as important enough to precede commissioning. The fourth model (U.K.), with the longest officer training school, requires no experience prior to commissioning, but appears to foster some time-based leader development during its 48-week pre-commissioning course.

Second, that national resources and geopolitical conditions shape the models of these four nations. Germany and Norway, both with relative stability, wealth, and undemanding military requirements, take longer and arguably use more resources to develop and educate their officers than either the U.K. or Israel. Israel, a universal conscription nation with constant military requirements, develops its officers the quickest and arguably the cheapest, and has only recently instituted the opportunity for university education during an officer's later company grade years. The U.K. system resists easy comparison, since it selects its commissioning potential overwhelmingly from among the supply of college-educated civilians. It can be assumed, like the other models, that the U.K. model is feasible due to the available supply of college-educated volunteer

applicants, and because of the existing infrastructure and traditions associated with the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Last, all four models have evolved over the years and it must be assumed that they will continue to evolve based on the same conditions: time, resources available, and geopolitical considerations. These models should not be considered unchangeable by any means.

Analysis of Impacts of the Model on Combat Effectiveness

This section answers and analyzes the primary research question, “What is the impact of the Army’s junior officer development model on combat effectiveness?” It is divided into four sections, each providing findings and analysis using the four research criteria presented in chapter 3. To review, the four research criteria of this thesis are:

- (1) the occupational screening of junior officers; (2) technical competence and organizational stress; (3) confidence, judgment, and leadership by example; and (4) empathy for and understanding of subordinates.

The Occupational Screening of Junior Officers

Evidence found throughout the research literature suggests a junior officer with previous military experience is more committed to the organization, as well as the reverse, than a junior officer with no similar experience. He has chosen the military as an occupation, so to speak, and the military as an institution has chosen him. This impacts combat effectiveness in the form of the commitment of the junior officer to his soldiers and to the mission. In other words, an officer who “wants to be there” likely will put forth

a greater degree of effort into his work. An analysis of the application of less or more experience on this criterion follows, in order to ascertain impacts to combat effectiveness.

In theory, positive feedback given by the individual to the institution of the Army as his choice of occupation, indicated by enlistment, re-enlistment, or application for acceptance into a commissioning program, is one-half of the process this research will call the “occupational screening process.” The same type of positive feedback is given by the Army to the individual by providing additional benefits or opportunities for advancement, such as promotion, schooling, or acceptance into a pre-commissioning program, and eventual accession into the ranks of professional officers, is the other half. When both parties provide similar feedback following an initial term of service, a more than tentative career commitment is establishment. In other words, both have positively screened the other for a more long-term work relationship.

The screening process of junior officers with prior military experience is different from the screening process of junior officers without such experience, in that the former screen and are screened in large part before commissioning. For junior officers with no previous experience, the acculturation and acclimation process to the Army, also in theory, occurs after commissioning. The result is perhaps predictable: pre-screened junior officers likely remain in the Army at higher rates, having already made an intermediate commitment to the Army; and may function at higher levels initially, due to career satisfaction and familiarity with Army culture.

Examples from literature providing proof of this occupational screening process with respect to junior officers with and without previous military experience can be presented in a logical sequence. They begin with theories explaining factors of

commitment of junior officers to the institution of the Army, followed by the average time required for screening or commitment, and finally, factors affecting the career commitment of junior officers.

The occupational screening process occurs over time and covers formative career milestones. For example, a junior officer with previous military experience has already attended and graduated from basic and advanced individual training, served in a unit, observed both noncommissioned and commissioned officer supervisors, and applied for pre-commissioning training. This represents more than mere time served, since it assumes a degree of positive adaptation to military culture, along with the acquisition of some basic individual and collective technical skills (Hogan 2004, 37). It also shows a sense of commitment to the Army, which is a strong suggestion that the soldier finds the military culture and profession agreeable. The occupational screening for officers without prior military experience occurs by necessity during and after implementation. This places additional stress on the organization as well as on the individual, because neither has yet had the opportunity to evaluate or decide whether or not to choose the other.

Sociologist Morris Janowitz, in his 1971 social portrait of the military, *The Professional Soldier*, examined officer career commitment in cadets at service academies. The staffs of the academies, he wrote, “admit privately that, although the intelligence level of new recruits rises year by year, there is no concurrent increase in the sense of career commitment.” While it is the goal of the service academies to nurture the nation’s next generation of military leaders, Janowitz added, “there is no valid scientific procedure for selecting heroic leaders or for screening military strategists.” He also commented on the increased selection by the service academies from the enlisted ranks as something that

possibly “represents a search for persons with strong career commitments and a heroic outlook” (Janowitz 1971, 122-3).

One personnel study provides additional theoretical basis of the occupational screening process by stating that three practical needs are fulfilled whenever a new soldier enters the military, receives training, and assumes duties in his career or occupational specialty: one, “the position’s work is accomplished and its responsibilities are fulfilled;” two, “the member gains skill and experience necessary to perform successfully at higher levels;” and three, “the service can observe the member’s performance in order to assess whether the member has the necessary ability for higher levels of responsibility” (Hogan 2004, 37). This suggests that both the individual and the institution are assessing future commitment to the other during the initial period of service. It would also appear to take place no differently for entry-level junior officers than for entry-level enlisted soldiers.

Another example from social science describes occupational screening as it applies to the transition of enlisted personnel into the commissioned grades. In this example, the authors suggest that this transition is less dramatic and problematic than the same transition from civilian to military officer.

Ordinarily enlisted men entering OCS will have completed at least their recruit training while many will have had relatively long periods of enlisted experience prior to their acceptance as officer candidates. Thus, the major impact of initiation into military life will have been met and mastered by the candidate before he begins his transitional training for officer status . . . becoming an officer seems more likely to be viewed by the candidate as simply a transition to a higher status in a military institution to whose salient characteristics he is already generally adjusted. (Coates and Pellegrin 1965, 304)

Some international commissioning models are designed in such a way as to require occupational screening immediately upon entry into the service and on a constant

basis thereafter, with important selection made at critical career decision points, all prior to commissioning. These models, such as those in use by Germany, Norway, or Israel, were presented in chapter 2. They stand in contrast to the U.S. Army model, also presented in chapter 2, which commissions junior officers before “testing” them as leaders in an actual job setting. Martin Van Creveld, the noted military historian, commented on this notion of “pre-ordained” junior officers when he observed, “The outstanding feature of the road toward earning a commission in the United States is that most future officers are designated as such even before they are taken in to the forces . . . nor, for that matter, does it have anything to do with the candidate’s actual performance in military life” (Van Creveld 1990, 2). On-the-job occupational screening may be as useful a selector of leaders as any in use today. In any case, selection of future leader talent remains an inexact science. Psychologist Fillmore H. Sanford, in studying military leadership in the 1950s, observed: “Much effort, both scientific and otherwise, has been invested in the attempt to select young men who will turn out to be good military leaders. It is fair to say . . . no one has yet devised a method of proven validity for selecting either military or non-military leaders” (Janowitz 1974, 74).

If occupational screening occurs prior to a specific decision point or event, such as the decision to remain with or depart the service, an arbitrary time period can be ascertained as to when this decision is most likely going to be made. This time period is best expressed in terms of years of service, and decided upon by the individual, the institution, or both. This can be as simple as completion of the initial term of service, whether it is three, four, or six years, but is likely a different number, aligned more accurately with factors related to job satisfaction, which may occur before or after the

expiration of the initial term. Interestingly, significant literary reference exists of a minimum time period needed by the institution to screen an individual for continuation or for higher placement. That period seems to be, near unanimously, two years.

Historically, two years is the period of time Frederick the Great of Prussia considered it “necessary to make seasoned troops out of his recruits” (Albion 1929, 103). Roughly twenty years after the death of Frederick, the Prussian government allocated “three-fifths of regular army officer” positions to be “picked from men in the active army, recommended by their colonels” (Albion, 108). The technical proficiency of these Prussian former enlisted men was guaranteed by additional education and training that resembled an apprenticeship as a military professional. For the two-fifths who were not selected from among the enlisted ranks, they were made to “serve six months in the enlisted ranks, attend a division school for nine months technical military training, and then pass the officers’ examination in technical military subjects” (Huntington 1952, 42).

In 1832 in France, national law “reserved one-third of all second lieutenant vacancies for *sous officiers* (NCOs) with at least two years’ experience in grade” (Fisher 2001, 83). In 1892 in the U.S., congress proclaimed “in a measure . . . concerning the promotion of enlisted men to commissioned rank . . . henceforth, not only NCOs but any unmarried soldier under thirty years of age and with two years of good service could present himself to the board of examiners of his department” (Fisher 2001, 137).

Congress reasserted this two-year service discriminator again in the National Defense Act of 1920, stating the “appointment of officers . . . shall be made in the grade of 2LT . . . second, from warrant officers and enlisted men of the regular army between the ages of 21 and 30 years, who have had at least two years’ service” (Albion 1929,

399). As mentioned previously, the modern IDF also requires a minimum of two years' enlisted service before accepting the most talented, high-performing soldiers into its pre-commissioning program. The Norwegian army requires roughly two years' enlisted time, (Helleberg, 2010) and the German army requires apprenticeships of three years prior to university study and implementation as junior officers (von Plueskow 2009).

The importance of a period of apprenticeship, for lack of a better term, can be illustrated by the following example from U.S. Army experience in growing an NCO corps for its mass draftee force in Vietnam. The Army created the Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course, a 20-week school to create NCOs from recent basic training graduates in order to solve a critical shortage of squad-level leadership for Vietnam. According to one history, the second-order effects of creating and fielding small-unit leaders without experience resulted in the failure and eventual elimination of this concept. Issues that were never satisfactorily resolved were: "to win from senior NCOs final acceptance of the NCOCC graduates; to train and persuade the best among them to make a career of the Army; and to identify those combat arms NCOs who were either physically or emotionally unfit to serve . . . and retrain or eliminate them" (Fisher 2001, 327). Samuel Stouffer's team, while studying the Army a quarter-century earlier, seemed to reach the same conclusion about officer leadership and the need for some factor of time prior to implementation: "The same was generally true of officers. No one could ordinarily advance in rank without having served a minimum time in the rank below" (Stouffer et al 1949a, 271).

Looking at the negative, there likely exists a point at which a long-service enlisted soldier is less likely to adapt to the different culture and challenges of commissioned

service. At this point, which is represented by “several” years of service, it is necessary to hypothesize that an enlisted soldier may be “bound by his experience” and less able to learn and adapt to officer culture and work-related problems. In this example, too much experience in the enlisted ranks may pose “diminishing returns” when applied to implementation-level junior officer duties and responsibilities. This may be due to the introductory learning nature of junior officer development, which may stifle the already experienced individual, an inability to move outside of a comfort zone in order to learn new tasks and responsibilities, or an inability to develop new officer-to-officer relationships.

Transitioning to the natural outcome of occupational screening, retention, the Army has exerted great effort in the past decade and a half in trying to understand the attitudes of its company grade officers toward choosing the Army as a career. During this time, more than expected chose to depart the service (GAO 2007). Since correctly projected retention rates guarantee the adequate manning of officer personnel at the intermediate and senior levels, lower than expected retention rates put the Army at risk of operating without sufficient key leaders for the future.

The Army has experienced difficulties over the past 15 years in retaining sufficient numbers of company grade officers beyond their initial term of service. Viewed from one angle, the officers the Army has retained at the highest rate during this period have been OCS officers with prior military experience. Using the same basis, the officers in this period the Army has retained at the lowest rates have been USMA and ROTC scholarship officers. The difference in these rates are nearly two to one (Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso 2009a, 5).

As a case study, the Army examined the year group 1996 officer cohort separated by individual commissioning sources for continuation rates on active duty after eight years in service. The study revealed that of all OCS In-Service officers (those with prior enlisted service) commissioned in 1996, about 74 percent remained in the Army in 2004. Of the USMA officers of that same year group, just over 40 percent remained. The ROTC 4-year scholarship officers fared worse, with a continuation rate of about 37 percent. ROTC non-scholarship officers had the next highest continuation rate after OCS In-Service, at about 56 percent. Next, in descending order, were ROTC 2-year scholarship officers (54 percent) and ROTC 3-year scholarship officers (46 percent). OCS Enlistment Option officers, who enlist as civilians with college degrees and attend OCS following successful completion of basic training, continued at the lowest rate of all, according to the case study (Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso 2009a, 5-10).

Many different factors are at play in this finding, including the closer proximity of prior enlisted OCS officers to retirement and therefore the increased likelihood, as a group, to remain in the service. What is interesting though, is on the face of this data, a group of officers all with previous military experience were almost twice as likely to remain in the service as a group on their initial term of service.

The interesting aspect of this research into continuation rates of the 1996 cohort of officers was the point at which the largest body of officers departed the service. For USMA and ROTC 4-year scholarship officers, it was nearly identical: both maintained continuation rates of 90 percent through their initial service obligations (10 percent attrition can be attributed to medical or other administrative separations) of five and four years respectively, and then almost immediately fell to 60 percent continuation rates. At

that point, the downward retention slope, so to speak, flattened, and over the course of the next four years each lost roughly another 20 percent to settle at their reported rates of 2004. The OCS In-Service group, however, maintained a 96 percent continuation rate through its initial obligation of three years and then dropped immediately to about 87 percent before its downward retention slope flattened. Over the remaining five years in the survey, the OCS In-Service cohort lost another 13 percent (Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso 2009a, 5-10). Its retention curve on the chart was also the flattest over time of all six commissioning categories, portraying the greatest stability and suggesting the least amount of future dynamic movement.

Some researchers make the observation, according to this study of year group 1996 officers, that this phenomena is representative of a larger trend, and that “continuations on active duty past the commissioning obligation are *lowest* among the junior officers that the U.S. Army invested the *most* in” (Wardynski, Lyle and Colaruss 2009a, 4). While this is true in relation to USMA and ROTC scholarship officers, it does not explain why OCS Enlistment Option officers, college graduates with no previous military experience, had the lowest continuation rates of all. OCS Enlistment Option officers arguably are the group the Army has invested in the least at the time of commissioning. All three sources with the lowest retention rates all share one thing in common: they contain a vast majority of individuals without prior military experience who are undergoing the occupational screening process during their initial implementation periods as junior officers.

What is also apparent from this research is that the group of junior officers all with prior military experience--the OCS In-Service officers--continued at the highest rate

likely because based on years of service they were acclimated and acculturated to the military, had already chosen the military as a career, and just as importantly, were chosen by the institution for higher level advancement. In short, during their prior military service and experience, they had completed the occupational screening process.

Technical Competence and Organizational Stress

Technical competence relates to knowledge and practice of job-specific doctrine and procedures, and experience with job-specific tasks. More technical competence, obviously, equates into greater job efficiency and ultimately improved combat effectiveness. Organizational stress is related to technical competence in a junior officer in that the more technically competent is the leader, logically the less additional training, mentoring, or assistance he requires with basic tasks, and the fewer elementary errors he makes when executing these same tasks.

Research analysis indicates that a junior officer with prior military experience has the benefit of increased exposure to military tasks and therefore has, on the average, more technical competence than a similar junior officer with no experience. By extension, he requires less train-up on individual and collective skills during implementation, causing less stress on superiors and subordinates, who bear the burden of facilitating the junior officer's on-the-job training (HQ DA 2006, 3-20).

Becker's theory of human capital states that individuals who work in organizations that are unique in their product and contribution to the sponsoring public, such as the military, require high degrees of "firm-specific" knowledge. Furthermore, this knowledge can be gained only while immersed in the organization's culture and day-to-day operations (Becker 1993, 50). Because of this, according to another theorist,

“experience gained outside the service is not relevant. As a result, military organizations generally have an ‘in-at-the-bottom and up-through-the-ranks’ personnel system” (Rostker 2004, 149).

A junior officer with no previous military experience, while having received pre-implementation training and exposure to military culture prior to assuming duties as a direct leader, is still at the starting point in his “firm-specific” on-the-job development. Achieving the necessary level of technical competence takes time. According to Coates and Pellegrin, “Military skills, whether in leadership or in technical specialties, are as a rule too complex to be mastered in one period of enlistment” (Coates and Pellegrin 1965, 235). The skills of officers, which can be assumed as more complex than those of enlisted soldiers, likely take at least a similar length of time to master. The inference from these ideas is that technical competence in military jobs is gained from doing military jobs. The associated inference is that a junior officer with no prior military experience begins the process of attaining technical competence upon implementation. This period of learning likely requires, to extrapolate from the previous section concerning occupational screening, a minimum of two years.

Specific research suggests that prior military experience can give a junior officer a “head start” of sorts over his peers. A snapshot of officer evaluation data from the late 1990s and early 2000s does lend some credence to the likelihood of junior officers with previous military experience immediately performing at a higher level than their inexperienced peers, at least in the eyes of their senior raters, or battalion commanders. The data, collected by a USMA economics research team, compared officer evaluation reports for officers with and without prior experience (based on commissioning source)

and found that OCS In Service officers received a higher percentage of “Above Center of Mass” reports on their first evaluation as platoon leaders, by a significant margin, than all other sourced officers. It is worthwhile to note that this margin decreased over time, and that officers from other commissioning sources--especially USMA and ROTC scholarship officers--began to achieve with or significantly greater than the OCS In Service officers at the latter company grade and early field grade ranks (Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso 2010b, 8). It appears that the “head start” prior military experience provides a junior officer, while real and significant, begins to diminish during the latter junior officer years, i.e. prior to promotion to Captain. This provides a tentative agreement between the previously analyzed minimum time of occupational screening (two years), and the amount of time it took, according to the above data, for junior officers without prior military experience to “catch up,” or even “pass” their more experienced peers.

Given a lack of prior military experience in many junior officers, the Army formally addresses this developmental challenge in junior officers at implementation time in a troop unit (HQ DA 2010, 3-5). Responsibility for the leader development of these newly-implemented junior officers legally falls on commanders, but in practice and even by guiding leadership doctrine, the day-to-day business of on-the-job training for junior officers falls on NCOs. According to FM 6-22, the Army’s foundational doctrine on leadership, “NCOs have other roles as trainers, mentors, communicators, and advisors. When junior officers first serve in the Army, their NCO helps to train and mold them. When lieutenants make mistakes, seasoned NCOs can step in and guide the young officer back on track. Doing so ensures mission accomplishment and soldier safety” (HQ DA

2006, 3-20). This suggests, given the differing complexity between officer and enlisted tasks, that NCOs are either already competent enough at junior officer tasks to teach them, or that our entry-level junior officers are learning skills of the sort taught easily by NCOs--basic soldier or beginning leadership skills. It also makes a clear link between technical competence and organizational stress by including “soldier safety” as a “cost” of leader error, and between technical competence and combat effectiveness.

This seems to be embedded in American military culture, along with the resulting organizational stress resulting from the disparity in technical skill between experienced NCO and developing junior officer. In one historical snapshot from the 1830s frontier Army culture, the training of new officers is completed by an experienced NCO. “Junior officers appointed from civil life, as most officers were, resented having to rely upon [the first sergeant’s] coaching due to their inexperience. Professional soldiers, on the other hand, appreciated and came to rely upon him” (Sacca 1989, 4). While it is problematic to analyze “resentment” of NCO coaching by junior officers, the example does underscore the friction or unit stress that might result from an inexperienced junior officer’s implementation period train-up.

The Israeli model as described in chapter 2 seems to be designed in the opposite manner, and perhaps understandably, yields different results. According to one IDF expert, “since any combat officer has already served as both a soldier and an NCO, he is spared the tutorship of his NCOs on his first assignment. If anything, the opposite is the case. Hence, the latent function of the typical western NCO is completely absent in the Israeli system” (Gal 1986, 116). The additional item of interest from this model is that the

Israeli system grows, and relies upon, the junior officer corps much in the same way the U.S. Army does its NCO corps.

Returning to the topic of organizational stress, a junior officer with increased technical competence due to previous military experience is less likely to be subjected to micromanagement by his superiors, which reduces friction within the organization, increases the officer's job satisfaction, and possibly his organizational commitment and retention in the Army (HQ DA 2001a, 2). In addition, according to IDF observers, the junior officer's technical competence may reduce certain types of stress on his unit and on the organization as a whole, since he is able to function with less supervision, requires less assistance from his NCOs, and enables his small unit to train together on more complex tasks sooner than a leader undergoing more on-the-job training (Gal 1986, 116).

Two of the *ATLDP* report's key findings with respect to junior officer dissatisfaction dealt with the lack of "adequate leader development experiences . . . [which] leads to a perception that micromanagement is pervasive" (HQ DA 2001, 2). Recent research supports the first finding, and suggests the perceived problem has become worse for junior officers rather than better. Data prepared by a USMA economics research team portrays time in platoon leader jobs for second lieutenants in 1997 through 2006. In those nine years, according to figures, the average rated months as a platoon leader for a junior officer went from 15 in 1997 to 10 in 2006, while the number of "excess" officers rose (Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso 2010a, 6).

This may be simple economics--the Army commissioning more officers due to an expected higher attrition rate through ten years of service (Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso 2010a, 6)--but it also suggests that if junior officers were dissatisfied in 2001

with “inadequate leader development experiences,” then the same is still perhaps true, if it has not worsened. By extension, junior officers with limited exposure to these key jobs are likely developing necessary technical skills at a slower rate, or over a longer time period. The “head start” junior officers with prior military experience have over their inexperienced peers may diminish at a slower rate.

The other referenced finding of the *ATLDP*, micromanagement and its negative impact, has no related statistic. The problem it presents for leader development is that it accomplishes exactly what it intends: prevents inexperienced personnel from making mistakes. Unfortunately, it also hampers those same personnel from learning from their own mistakes and learning quickly, which according to the *ALDS*, is a contemporary imperative (HQ DA 2009c, 10). As one social scientist observed, “A theme common to both air and ground operations on distributed battlefields is the pressure this mode of operation will put on very junior officers and enlisted people, especially in the ground forces. These personnel will need to make decisions and acquire skills historically associated with much more senior ranks” (Cote 2004, 66). Considering that micromanagement may always be a factor in the development of inexperienced personnel, it can be assumed that the technical competence acquired from prior military experience can create a buffer between junior officer and superior that allows the junior officer to lead with less interference.

The Korean and Vietnam wars provide useful historical background on the challenges of creating leaders out of inexperienced draftee talent. In Korea, according to historian Ernest Fisher, “dilution of experienced personnel as a result of the war necessitated increasing centralization of authority and control . . . consequently,

oversupervision became a hallmark of the Korean War and post-Korean War period” (Fisher 2001, 278).

For the Vietnam era, Fisher provides an interesting observation on the organizational perils of inexperienced leadership “corrected” by micromanagement. In this example, NCOs developed through the Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course were considered too inexperienced to be left alone to execute their duties and care for soldiers. The alleged micromanagers? Company grade officers. As related by Fisher, “Because of a chronic shortage of experienced NCOs, many officers, especially at the company level, resumed the practice of bypassing their noncoms when dealing with the troops . . . this eroded the sergeant’s proper role as a small-unit leader and pushed him to the sidelines where he became a spectator instead of the focus of the action.” The chief irony of this practice, Fisher adds, was that it occurred exactly at a time when, “because of the nature of tactics employed in Vietnam, the small-unit leader was more needed than ever before” (Fisher 2001, 324).

The Plattsburgh Manual, a document that informed how the U.S. Army would create its mass expansion officer corps for service in the First World War, summarizes the findings of this section concerning technical competence and micromanagement: “A good private makes a good corporal, a good corporal makes a good sergeant, a good sergeant makes a good lieutenant--a good colonel makes a good brigadier general--all exactly as in civil life” (Ellis and Garey 1917, 200). The inference from this is that adequate time and exposure to develop technical skills at the next lowest position creates conditions for success as one progresses upward in rank and responsibility.

Confidence, Judgment and Leadership by Example

Confidence and judgment relate to non-technical aspects of leadership that are a by-product of competence, experience, and reflection. A more confident junior officer with good judgment obviously can lead with greater authority and skill, and will increase the combat effectiveness of his unit. In addition, a confident leader with good judgment is also postured to set a more desirable example for his soldiers to follow during training or operations, given the assumption, supported by doctrine, that soldiers invariably look to their leader for an example to emulate.

Research evidence suggests that junior officers with prior experience have, or are best postured to have, enhanced skills in these non-technical areas that only time and performance of duties can develop, such as confidence, the ability to lead by example, adaptability, and judgment. The assumption that time and exposure to operations and day to day Army business are the prime developers of these competencies is supported by examples from Army leadership doctrine, social science, and history.

FM 6-22 discusses good judgment as something that comes from experience, and allows a leader to set the sort of example that is necessary for success in combat. Judgment, states Army doctrine, “goes hand in hand with agility . . . good judgment on a consistent basis is important for successful Army leaders and much of it comes from experience. Leaders acquire experience through trial and error and by watching the experiences of others” (HQ DA 2006, 6-2). According to World War II Army general Omar Bradley, “Judgment comes from experience and experience comes from bad judgments” (HQ DA 2006, 6-2).

The development of judgment skills acquired from experience, such as “having prior opportunities to experience reactions to severe situations,” (HQ DA 2006, 7-79) can then feed into the ability to lead by example. For example, once the leader has collected experiences gleaned from these “severe situations,” he becomes aware of what “right looks like,” and is better prepared to lead confidently and by example. In the end, according to our leadership doctrine, “Leaders set an example whether they know it or not. Countless times leaders operate on instinct that has grown from what they have seen in the past” (HQ DA 2006, 7-75). All of this suggests that copious experience, including even poor judgments rendered or observed, are helpful in acquiring the sort of confidence that will develop the leader into someone who can set the appropriate example for subordinates to follow.

Social scientists who observe military culture provide additional insight into the subtleties concerning example in leadership within military social systems. According to Janowitz, in combat “authority is based less on formal rank and legal authority and more on personal leadership and the ability to create primary group solidarity and small unit effectiveness” (Janowitz 1971, introduction xx). Janowitz also states that because “the contemporary military establishment” places “increased emphasis on group consensus” over authoritarian control, “tactical leadership must be based on example and demonstrated competence” (Janowitz 1974, 101). Coates and Pellegrin theorize that success in combat is as related to the effectiveness of the small group as it is to the individual. “As is so often emphasized by military psychologists, man is the ultimate military weapon. In extension of this emphasis, military sociologists hold that social systems of man are also ultimate weapon systems” (Coates and Pellegrin 1965, 179). The

leader, as is well known, is the central member of this group or social system, and by extension, is the linchpin of this “ultimate weapon system.”

The Israeli model of combat leadership, which is based on leadership by example, “requires an experienced leader to assess and mitigate risks and to make correct decisions” (Gal 1986, 135). To produce experienced leaders who are able to lead by example, the IDF selects its officers exclusively from the ranks of its conscripted enlisted force, as described in chapter 2. All future officers serve for two years in the ranks prior to attending a commissioning course, in order to begin to develop the technical skills, confidence and judgment required to become a by-example style of leader (Gal 1986, 121). According to IDF leader development philosophy, “The ultimate test of leadership is in combat, where the only effective way to lead is by personal example” (Gal 1986, 115).

Without the necessary foundation of experience to develop the confidence and judgment necessary to lead convincingly by example, a junior officer finds himself challenged when made the functional leader of more experienced soldiers. While the junior officer has legitimate power within the platoon based on his leadership role, he more than likely cedes “expert power” to his experienced NCOs, and to some or many of his junior enlisted soldiers. The concept of expert power is based on knowledge and experience, and according to some theorists, can sway the decision-making or cloud the judgment of “less expert” personnel who are in positions of legitimate authority (Hughes 2006, 114). The results can be problematic, especially for those with little experience in such situations, and can degrade the ability of the legitimate leader to influence the group. This phenomena is described below:

Because expert power is a function of the amount of knowledge one possesses relative to the rest of the members of the group, it is possible for followers to have considerably more expert power than leaders in certain situations. For example, new leaders often possess less knowledge of the jobs and tasks performed in a particular work unit than the followers do, and in this case the followers can potentially wield considerable influence when decisions are made regarding work procedures, new equipment, or the hiring of additional workers. . . . So long as different followers have considerably greater amounts of expert power, it will be difficult for a leader to influence the work unit on the basis of expert power alone. (Hughes 2006, 114)

Historical examples seem to agree with modern theories of leadership with respect to judgment, confidence, and example, and the necessity of developing these competencies over time, and preferably before battle. Classical scholar Victor Davis Hanson observed the power of example found in ancient Greek accounts, noting, “If a general showed himself determined to advance forward or simply perish where he stood, rather than forsake his men to the rear, most were encouraged to do the same” (Hanson, 1989, 106). Of soldiers in the phalanx, wrote Hanson, “All believed that their supreme commander could best further his army’s cause by leadership through example, by fighting in the ranks on the right wing of the phalanx where his hoplites might be buoyed by his personal display of courage” (Hanson 1989, 116).

Experience was a major factor as well, according to Hanson. “There were also many important advantages in having so many men past thirty among the troops. The psychological power derived from having all segments of society take part in battle was enormous; even more important was the experience of prior battle which these men brought to combat” (Hanson 1989, 93). The presence of these experienced men, some of whom were without doubt formal leaders, among the untried was “the assurance that there were men among them who had in the past not flinched from advancing into the spears of the enemy, and were hardly likely to do so now” (Hanson 1989, 95).

Samuel Stouffer's team of social psychologists found similar attitudes and beliefs among the World War II veterans they surveyed concerning the importance of example in leadership. One "wounded veteran of the North African campaign said, 'About officers-- everybody wants somebody to look up to when he's scared. It makes a lot of difference.' For an officer to be readily available to be cast in this role by enlisted men," concluded Stouffer's team, "he must have their confidence that he is actually a source of strength" (Stouffer et al 1949a, 124). According to the teams' findings, "if the officer shared the dangers and hardships of the men successfully, they would then be the more likely to do their part, whereas the officer who held back from taking personal risks invited similar behavior from his men." Ultimately, they observed, "it seems likely that the men's attitudes toward their officers had a real importance in determining whether men fought aggressively and stayed in the fight" (Stouffer et al 1949a, 127).

The opposite, or the lack of confidence and judgment derived from the junior officer's inexperience, can inspire catastrophic results given a worst-case scenario. The leader of an infantry or armor platoon, for example, controls mass destructive combat power and must know when and where to apply this force, and when it is justified and lawful to do so. A historical example is the incident at My Lai, Vietnam in March, 1968, in which a U.S Army unit committed the mass murder of roughly 400 noncombatants. The official Army investigation into this incident, known as the Peers Report, cites the inexperience of the unit's platoon leaders as a major factor in the war crime. The report states these junior officers chose to follow rather than question orders from their company commander concerning the use of lethal force on unarmed villagers who were mostly women, children, and old men. The Peers Report noted the "extraordinary degree

of influence” wielded by the company commander, a career officer known as a strict disciplinarian, over these still-developing platoon leaders (Rielly 2001, 3).

A study about Army and Marine Corps combat leadership performance at the Chosin Reservoir early in the Korean War provides similar findings about experience and leadership. It links the lack of experience with diminished judgment, culminating in operational disaster. In this battle, Army leaders of one unit--none of whom were experienced in combat--lost or abandoned all of their equipment and half of their men, while Marine Corps leaders in an adjacent unit, all of whom had previous combat experience from World War II, were able to maintain or care for nearly all of their equipment and men (Kirkland 1995, 10). The study concludes that leader experience was the key factor between why the Army unit fared differently than the Marine Corps unit. One factor of success for Marine Corps leaders, noted by the author in this study, is that they were experienced enough to know when not to follow orders to the letter from an unseen higher headquarters. They also understood the importance, from experience, of caring for their troops and equipment while continuing their efforts at mission accomplishment. According to the author:

The knowledge that comes from experience is directly useful in solving the practical problems of combat, but its indirect utility may be even more important. An experienced leader who knows what he is doing has the confidence to stand up to his superiors, and he has the moral authority to make his argument stick. An inexperienced leader does not know what is and is not possible; his only recourse is to have faith in his boss, say “can do,” and plunge ahead. (Kirkland 1995, 10)

To summarize, both in theory and in practice a junior officer with previous military experience has received opportunities to improve his judgment by making correct and incorrect decisions, or by observing the similar decisions of others. This increases his leadership confidence and better prepares him to set the necessary example

that will result in combat effectiveness. As John Shy observed, in his survey on combat experience gained from first battles in America's history, experience adds something to a leader's pre-combat preparation that seems to have no substitute:

Veterans of combat agree that certain vital lessons can be learned only under fire. In general, it seems that nothing but experience teaches soldiers and armies how to hold the delicate balance between courage and caution; too much audacity jeopardizes the survival on which victory must rest, but excessive caution usually means that fleeting chances to win are missed. (Shy 1986, 341)

Empathy for and Understanding of Subordinates

Last, the practice of empathizing with, understanding, and taking care of soldiers, which involves ensuring not only basic human needs are met but that soldiers are led with competence, concern, and compassion, is believed to not only enhance unit morale, but to increase combat effectiveness. A behavioral sciences research team at USMA observed, "leaders who took care of their soldiers, who met their tactical needs through their own competence and skills . . . and who allayed their soldiers' anxieties that they would respect their lives by avoiding wasteful casualties--these leaders led units that were the most combat effective" (Brower 2001, 41).

Research evidence exists that suggests junior officers with prior military experience are better prepared at relating to, empathizing with, and caring for their enlisted subordinates. This may be due to the common experience shared by the prior enlisted officer and the enlisted soldier which fosters understanding, and some level of respect and trust from either perspective. The common bond, if anything, is the mutual experience of leaving civilian life and becoming an Army entry-level enlisted soldier, which can be considered a transformational experience, along with service as a member of the enlisted force.

While this suggestion begins in the abstract, current doctrine, social scientific research, and historical example lend the notion concrete example. FM 6-22 addresses the credibility and trust gained by NCOs in the eyes of their subordinates from having experienced the life of an enlisted soldier. Per doctrine, “soldiers look to their NCOs for solutions, guidance and inspiration. Soldiers can relate to NCOs since NCOs are promoted from the junior enlisted ranks” (HQ DA 2006, 3-16). Our doctrine also states that mentoring soldiers is logically facilitated by some sort of shared experience between leader and led. “Mentors have likely experienced what their protégées and mentees are experiencing, or are going to experience” (HQ DA 2006, 8-84). Lacking a shared experience with enlisted soldiers, junior officers without prior military experience are immediately disadvantaged at mentoring soldiers until such time as they have developed more fully or completed their initial implementation assignment. Even then, their understanding of the problems of enlisted soldiers will likely be more expertly handled by NCOs. While no group of officers, prior military experience or not, may ever mentor enlisted soldiers as expertly as can NCOs, this as a junior officer leader competency seems useful, even necessary, since junior officers immediately assume supervisory roles as counselors and raters of unit NCOs upon implementation.

The strongest body of research exploring the realities of officer-enlisted relations in the Army, based on interviews and surveys across all ranks, occurred during and after World War II by Stouffer et al. His team’s findings enlightened senior military leaders enough to inspire post-war investigations and changes, such as the Doolittle Commission and the rewriting of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to prevent arbitrary abuses of rank by commissioned officers toward enlisted soldiers (Stouffer et al 1949a, 379). Much

of Stouffer's research was directed at discovering how enlisted soldiers felt about officers and how officers felt about the soldiers they led. In most of the findings, the two groups gave divergent answers, suggesting officers and enlisted personnel in the Army culture of World War II thought differently about most things.

A key finding by Stouffer's team concerning this difference in beliefs between officers and enlisted was, "officers who were formerly enlisted men were "more likely" to share the view of the enlisted men than were officers who had never been enlisted men" (Stouffer et al 1949a, 374). While that might seem elementary, a complementary finding may not: "Officers felt 'executive abilities' (carrying out orders promptly and thinking for oneself) were much more important than 'personal relations' abilities (helping soldiers, explaining things clearly, gaining liking of men). Privates felt exactly the opposite" (Stouffer et al 1949a, 405). What this illustrates, according to Stouffer's research, is while enlisted men generally maintained different values about day to day Army business than their officers, those officers without enlisted experience were more than likely unable to grasp this difference.

This is not to say that most U.S. Army officers in World War II did not try to relate to their soldiers or find this important. Another survey reported that the "vast majority (93 percent) of company grade officers surveyed in December, 1943 felt it was 'absolutely necessary' or 'very important' that their enlisted men feel their officers have a personal interest in their welfare." The same audience, or 71 percent of it, felt "they should have had more training on what to do about personal problems affecting the welfare of the individual soldier" (Stouffer et al 1949a, 388).

Stouffer's research goes on to suggest that the rank structure and the organization of the Army was as much a cause of diminished contact between officers and enlisted soldiers as simple or willful lack of concern. The NCO, in this structure, played a role in the artificial distance which separated officers from enlisted soldiers. Since the NCO was the official "go-between," his function was to "bridge the gap between officers and men."

According to Stouffer:

This bridge carried traffic in both directions. On the one hand, the NCO functioned as the representative of official authority in receiving orders from the officer and transmitting them to the other enlisted men under him. On the other hand, the NCO also served as the representative of the enlisted men in presenting their point of view to the officers. The noncom thus served as a very important communication link between the officer and the other enlisted men. (Stouffer et al 1949a, 401)

Other social scientists believe the traditional Army officer culture shares as much blame for reduced contact and understanding between officers and enlisted soldiers. On the indoctrination of officers prior to and during World War II, Coates and Pellegrin wrote:

The officer was taught that his first obligations were to his men. He was, however, informed that the social characteristics of enlisted men were different from his own . . . the enlisted man was to be viewed generally as less highly motivated, less perceptive and adaptable, and less able than the officer . . . the officer was indoctrinated with the belief that only if rigid social distinctions were maintained would his orders be obeyed under all circumstances. (Coates and Pellegrin 1965, 257)

The IDF, as discussed before, uses mandatory enlisted time prior to commissioning as its leader development model. According to Van Creveld, the upshot of this model "is that ground officers start their careers in common with enlisted personnel. . . . Contrary to that in many other armies, this system has ensured that commanders have a good understanding of their troops" (Van Creveld 1998, 116).

This has significant parallel, as explored earlier in this thesis in the survey of the evolution of officer development and in the description of selected international officer development models. One historical example states that some units “preferred officers who had come up through its own ranks . . . [who] usually served quite an apprenticeship as enlisted men before being made officers.” This refers to the Army National Guard between the world wars of the 20th century, as related by Lyons and Masland in their history of the ROTC. The benefit of this, felt Guard officers of the early 20th century, was the “sense of round-the-clock responsibility [these officers had] for their men” (Lyons and Masland 1959, 50).

The downside to greater understanding for subordinates based on shared enlisted experience is the possibility of over-identification with subordinates. This could negatively bias the junior officer’s communication or relationship with his superiors or chain of command whenever orders or matters arise which might place his soldiers or unit in a position of discomfort, inconvenience, or even danger. This presents a negative impact upon combat effectiveness, since the junior officer has allowed his need to “relate” to his subordinates overrule his legitimate requirement to execute lawful tasks or missions as directed by his chain of command, regardless of the stress, discomfort, or danger they might cause.

To summarize, junior officers with previous military experience are better prepared to have understanding of, and empathy for, their enlisted subordinates based on a shared experience of entry-level military service, and increased exposure to military operations and culture. While some risk is involved if a junior officer over-identifies with his subordinates, overall, greater understanding and empathy for subordinates translates

into taking care of soldiers, which research strongly suggests is a predictor of unit combat effectiveness.

Summary

This chapter presented findings and analysis of the primary research question, along with associated analysis of the three secondary research questions. The secondary research questions were analyzed at the beginning of this chapter, in order to provide a framework and background for the analysis of the primary research question. In the main body, qualitative analysis examined the four research criteria presented in chapter 3 for impacts of less or more experience in junior officers on the combat effectiveness of direct units, using the literature presented in chapter 2. Analysis revealed evidence in the form of multi-disciplinary examples from literature suggesting that greater attention be focused on the pillar of experience in the Army junior officer development model. This increased focus on experience could provide more technically competent, confident, and empathetic leadership, promoting increased combat effectiveness, and possibly increased retention of junior officers. The next chapter will provide a conclusion to this thesis, and recommendations for further research or institutional change based on these findings.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis was to answer and analyze the primary research question: What is the impact of the Army's junior officer development model on combat effectiveness? The research hypothesis was that of the three pillars of Army leader development (education, training, and experience), with respect to the junior officer development model, experience was the single pillar of the model most out of balance with the other two. The associated assumption was that this imbalance in leader development created some type of impact on the combat effectiveness of direct units. This thesis also answered and analyzed three secondary research questions, (1) How does the Army currently prepare junior officers from accession to initial leadership implementation? (2) How did the Army's current junior officer development model evolve? and (3) What are the alternatives to the Army's junior officer development model? in order to completely evaluate and provide findings and background for the primary question.

This chapter presents an interpretation of findings from the research question, including the meaning and implications of the results, and unexpected findings. Next, it provides recommendations for further study, including any unanswered questions, and things that could have been analyzed differently. Last, it summarizes the research and provides final conclusions.

To review, in chapter 4, analysis found evidence from the literature suggesting that greater attention be focused on the pillar of experience in the Army junior officer

development model. This increased focus on experience could provide more technically competent, confident, and empathetic direct unit leadership, promoting increased combat effectiveness, and possibly increased retention of junior officers.

Interpretation of Findings from Research Questions

The results from research analysis of the primary and secondary questions provide compelling evidence that more experience in the pre-implementation development of a junior officer can increase the combat effectiveness of a direct unit. This owes, according to findings, to the greater amount of time and exposure a junior officer with previous military experience has with military culture and day-to-day military operations in relation to a junior officer with no prior experience. This increased time spent on the job, so to speak, functions not only as a “trial period” of service to help both the individual and institution decide if the employee-employer relationship should continue, but also as a period of learning by doing, and learning by observing more experienced personnel. The accumulation of learning and experiences naturally builds competence and confidence, which leads to improved judgment, and according to the analysis, this leads to the ability to set the appropriate example for subordinates to follow. Last, since this prior military experience naturally occurs at the enlisted level, it fosters in the junior officer a greater understanding for his subordinates, leading to a deeper understanding and empathy for their needs and concerns, which research shows, develops units that function the most effectively in combat. This research proves the hypothesis and its associated assumption correct in that levels of prior military experience in a junior officer at implementation creates impacts, both positive and negative, to his performance and the combat effectiveness of his unit.

The findings further present an interrelatedness of impacts associated with the research criteria, suggesting experience impacts them all comprehensively rather than separately. For example, the low initial level of technical competence in a junior officer without prior military experience creates conditions where his superiors may utilize micromanagement techniques to mitigate or prevent the junior officer's technical, tactical, or judgmental errors. While this micromanagement may reduce some operational, training, or administrative risk to the unit, the junior officer loses opportunities to develop his technical competence, which would lead to improved confidence, as well as the development of judgment required to effectively lead by example. The frustration this junior officer may feel given the paradoxical situation of trying to gain experience while simultaneously being safeguarded from learning from experiences involving risk likely results in a negative retention decision. The junior officer makes the decision to remain in or depart from the service during the occupational screening process, which occurs during this initial term of service. Meanwhile, this junior officer with no prior enlisted service likely takes longer in gaining the trust of his enlisted subordinates, whom he must count upon, per doctrine, to assist in completing his on-the-job leader development. Until this junior officer spends sufficient time with his direct unit, he will not have an adequate understanding of his subordinates' jobs and functions, nor of the formal and informal dynamics of a direct unit. All of these are critical in that they lead eventually to trust between leader and led, which is indicative of high-performing units.

The implication of the above suggests that a period of consequence-free learning can be beneficial in the development of the future leader, and be of benefit to the direct

unit this individual will someday lead. It is also essential that this learning period not take place in a leadership position, nor in any position that has an impact upon the combat effectiveness or resources, both in manpower and materiel, associated with a direct unit. The learning period should take place in an entry-level enlisted position, with opportunity for advancement, in order to ensure initial supervision by experienced personnel and the opportunity to learn and make mistakes with much smaller implications. An arbitrary learning period might consist of the two years discussed in the chapter 4 section on the occupational screening process, during which an individual can acquire not only basic technical competence, but confidence in these abilities. The individual could reflect upon lessons in judgment gleaned from the observation of decisions and actions taken by leaders in operational situations. The individual could learn firsthand the “life of a soldier,” in the field and in the barracks, in order to fully understand and empathize with those he someday will lead.

Best of all, this period of learning would occur in the ranks, and therefore the individual would not be thrust into the position of making decisions he is experientially less qualified to make, or have his decision-making initiative, and associated learning, smothered by micromanagement. This period would give the individual an opportunity to decide for himself if the Army is the right career for him, and for the Army to decide the same about the individual. Were the soldier to decide to become an officer following this initial term of service and graduate from a commissioning program, he would likely remain in service beyond his initial term as a junior officer. In addition, he and his unit would likely function at a higher rate of combat effectiveness, due to his familiarity with

Army culture and day-to-day operations, than the units of his junior officer peers without prior military experience.

Unexpected findings of this research include the discovery that the current problem of junior officer accession, development, and retention is likely self-perpetuating. Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso's research on this subject showed that poor retention, because of officer dissatisfaction, can create dangerous conditions of over-accession of junior officers. With more officers in the institution requiring the same leader development experiences, it follows that time spent in these key developmental jobs will decrease in relation to the number of direct unit leadership jobs available. Reduced development time at the junior officer level has been blamed on decreased job dissatisfaction, which has led to reduced retention of this same cohort of junior officers. The irony of the situation is that, in trying to predict attrition and project the number of officers required for the field grade ranks ten years into an officer cohort's career lifecycle, the Army accesses more than it can adequately train. This causes even the junior officers who might have remained in the service under conditions more favorable to leader development to depart the service due mainly to these diminished leader developmental experiences. Just as detrimental, this reduced time in key developmental jobs for the officers who choose to remain creates an environment of slowed learning with respect to needed technical and non-technical leader skills.

Another surprising finding was scholarly debate concerning whether higher education was necessary in the development or implementation of a junior officer. A few prominent military historians and social scientists (Van Creveld 1990, 4; Janowitz 1971, 134) claimed that no clear evidence exists that a college education improves the ability of

a junior officer to lead soldiers effectively in combat. The requirement for higher education in the junior officer development model seems to be a uniquely post-19th century phenomenon, and took root in much of the world only in the 20th century. Historical evidence shows a give and take with respect to officer education, including the U.S. Army's own mass expansion officer corps of World War II, overwhelmingly manned by OCS officers, many without a college education, and by the junior officer development models of at least two very successful armies: the U.K. and Israel.

Recommendations for Further Study

Topics of interest touched upon but not addressed or answered by this research include an analysis of an alternative model of developing junior officers in the U.S. Army, based on the Israel or U.K. junior officer development model, and weighed against accession requirements and cost. This research would likely take the higher education requirement out of the junior officer development model and place it either prior to officer pre-commissioning training, as in the U.K. model, or sometime in the Captain years, as in the Israel model. Additionally, this study should consider a single commissioning school, on the U.K.'s Royal Military Academy Sandhurst model, to provide a common schooling in leadership training, followed by a shorter period of branch-specific technical training. This study should factor a minimum of two years enlisted service prior to attendance at the commissioning school, and weigh the costs, to both manpower demands and funds, of providing a three-year period for all captains to complete a baccalaureate degree prior to or after company command. This research could generate additional data concerning the occupational screening process, and perhaps suggest a new way of developing officers who are committed to a career as military

professionals. This study should also address the importance of critical thinking skills in junior officer development, and how best to ensure junior officers are skilled or educated in necessary levels of critical thinking needed to be competent direct leaders.

Another topic of interest would be a survey of the combat effectiveness of units during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, evaluated by commissioning source and levels of prior military experience in platoon leaders. While it is difficult to judge effectiveness in combat without bias, given the spectrum of variables that affect combat, this study could utilize the criteria presented in this thesis to either validate or invalidate this research's findings using the most current data available.

Additionally, based on the research in this thesis, the author hypothesizes that a link may exist between age, experience, and levels of combat stress. An empirical study of whether or not such a link exists would be useful in identifying any advantage with respect to resiliency or effectiveness, as defined by lower rates of combat stress, can be gained by a direct leader based on age or experience.

A final topic for further study would be an examination of the diminishing returns from a period of enlisted service in a junior officer. This study could provide insight concerning the appropriate placement of the period of "consequence-free learning" in a junior officer's development. The goal of the research would be to ascertain how much of the lessons and experience gained during this period of learning, ordinarily in the enlisted ranks, is retained during up to four years of higher education prior to commissioning. If experiences and learning gained from enlisted service prior to higher education are generally supplanted by more recent educational or life experiences from college, then it could be concluded that this period of "consequence-free learning" must occur directly

before commissioning in order to maintain currency. This research could also discover an arbitrary time period, in months or years, of how long formative job experiences remain applicable, for most individuals, after departure from a job.

Recommendations for Action

Based on the findings and analysis of the primary research question, this thesis recommends action be taken to restore experiential balance in the junior officer development model by mandating two years of enlisted service for all individuals who desire to attend a commissioning source. The insertion of an initial term of military service prior to or after education, and prior to officer training would provide a foundation of leader developmental skills that would, on the average, increase the combat effectiveness of direct units and foster increased career commitment on the part of junior officers.

Two years of enlisted service prior to commissioning would create officers with increased technical competence, confidence, judgment, and understanding of and empathy for subordinates. In addition, the two years of initial service would function as an inexpensive screening period for both the individual and the institution to “get to know each other” before making a significant investment in the other. Research indicates that this would also increase retention rates of officers commissioned in this fashion.

Army regulatory documents on commissioned service, such as publications governing the three commissioning sources, USMA, ROTC, and OCS, could be revised, adding two years of enlisted service to the list of pre-requisites for acceptance and attendance. Other current requirements for acceptance into each of the three sources, concerning age limits, numbers of dependents and marital status, should also be reviewed

for continued feasibility and fairness, given the increased age and experience of the applicants.

An unanticipated benefit of this recommendation for action would be an increase of potential officer talent in the enlisted ranks, for two years per individual. It can be assumed that enlisted soldiers competing for entry into commissioning programs would strive to become “model” soldiers while functioning as rank and file members of direct units. In addition, given the educational, physical, and leadership requirements for acceptance into a commissioning source, the entry of this group of talented, ambitious soldiers would have a positive impact on the performance of direct units throughout the Army.

One limitation of this recommendation is the uncertainty of the spectrum of conflict. This recommendation would be impractical were the nation forced to create an emergency expansion officer corps in the event of a national or global crisis approaching the magnitude of, or greater than, World War II. In this event, training would likely take precedence over experience or even education in the creation of a mass officer corps.

Summary and Conclusions

This thesis used qualitative analysis of multiple disciplinary sources of data to answer the primary research question, “What is the impact of the Army’s junior officer development model on combat effectiveness?” Research also explored the current U.S. Army junior officer development model, the historical evolution of officer development, and alternative models of officer development to reach objective findings concerning the impacts of this model upon combat effectiveness. The findings indicated a negative impact on combat effectiveness derived from an imbalance in this model with respect to

experience prior to the implementation of junior officers. Specific negative impacts include poor retention results from occupational screening; less developed technical competence, confidence, and judgment, resulting in decreased ability to set the appropriate example for subordinates to follow; and less understanding of, and empathy for, subordinates due to limited shared experiences.

The findings of this thesis are compelling in part because of the multiple disciplines of data and literature used to answer the research questions. Research analyzed federal law, Army strategy, regulations, doctrine, and command guidance; military history from the Greek and Roman period to the post-Vietnam U.S.; military sociology and social psychology focused on the behavior and motivation of individuals and groups in military social systems; and current studies about retention and performance of junior officers today. Nearly all of these contained the almost commonsensical implication or strong suggestion that direct units led by experienced personnel were believed to be, on the average, more successful than units led by inexperienced personnel.

The other compelling notion from this research is how much more combat effective, in theory, an already very experienced professional army could become by providing its future officers an opportunity to gain key developmental experiences before functioning as direct leaders. With comprehensive systems of civilian education and initial entry officer training already in place, adding two years of enlisted experience to the junior officer development model might be the most cost-effective way of ensuring the combat effectiveness of U.S. Army direct units in the years to come.

GLOSSARY

Combat effectiveness. “The ability of a unit to perform its mission. Factors such as ammunition, personnel, status of fuel, and weapon systems are assessed and rated” (HQ DA 2004, 1-35). According to FM 3-0, “Leadership in today’s operational environment is often the difference between success and failure” (HQ DA 2008a, 4-8).

Direct unit. Squad, platoon and company-level units, in which the link between leader and led is usually face to face (HQ DA 2006, 3-35).

Education. “Instruction with increased knowledge, skill, and/or experience as the desired outcome for the student. This is in contrast to training, where a task or performance basis is used and specific conditions and standards are used to assess individual and unit proficiency” (HQ DA 2009e, 200).

Experience. Learning and competencies gained through operational assignments. According to doctrine, “through experience gained during operational assignments, leaders acquire the confidence, leadership, and the competence needed for more complex and higher level assignments” (HQ DA 2009e, 1-18).

Implementation. The period of operational experience following professional training for a specific rank group. For example, junior officers begin the implementation portion of their leader development periods following completion of the Basic Officer Leadership Course and any assignment-specific training, such as Airborne, Ranger or Language School training. Pre-implementation refers to this period of training. Post-implementation refers to the same period specified in the term implementation.

Junior officer. A commissioned officer in the rank of Second Lieutenant or First Lieutenant.

Leader development. “The deliberate, continuous, sequential and progressive process, grounded in Army values, which grows Soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. Leader development is achieved through the life-long synthesis of the knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through the developmental domains of institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development” (HQ DA 2009e, 202).

Leader development model. The combination of institutional strategy, regulatory guidance, doctrine, and practice that is applied in the education, training and on the job experiences of a leader of a certain rank group, such as lieutenants or captains. For example, the combination of source documents and procedures which govern pre- and post-commissioning education and training along with initial job experiences constitute the junior officer development model. The three

pillars of the Army leader development model are education, training, and experience (HQ DA 2009c, 1).

Organizational unit. Brigade-level to corps or theater level units, in which the link between leader and led is usually through policies, procedures and communications (HQ DA 2006, 3-38).

Training. “An organized, structured process based on sound principles of learning designed to increase the capability of individuals or units to perform specified tasks or skills. Training increases the ability to perform in known situations with emphasis on competency, physical and mental skills, knowledge and concepts” (HQ DA 2009e, 205).

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USACGSC
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Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

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USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

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